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Federal Rule 44.1: Foreign Law in U.S. Courts Today
by
Vivian Grosswald Curran*

Abstract
This article presents an in-depth analysis of the latent methodological issues that are as much a
cause of U.S. federal court avoidance of foreign law as are judicial difficulties in obtaining
foreign legal materials and difficulties in understanding foreign legal orders and languages. It
explores Rule 44.1’s inadvertent introduction of a civil-law method into a common-law
framework, and the results that have ensued, including an incomplete transition of foreign law
from being an issue of fact to becoming an issue of law. It addresses the ways in which courts
obtain information about foreign law today, suggesting among others the methodological
implications causing sometimes hidden and misunderstood frustration on the part of courts
with foreign experts. It reviews and critiques suggestions for the use of court-appointed
experts, and addresses principal areas in which federal courts encounter foreign law: forum non
conveniens, and discovery, including both Section 1782 petitions where U.S. courts adjudicate
discovery issues for foreign litigants in cases being heard by a foreign tribunal; and the 2018
European General Data Protection Regulation. The GDPR cases to date allow us to understand
European perspectives on U.S. discovery from a background of European history. Although at a
still inconclusive stage in U.S. discovery decision-making, current GDPR cases already permit
some hypothesizing about potential future discovery developments in transnational litigation.
This is because the digital era law’s vast reach suggests the probability that new cases are just
as likely to have U.S. multinationals as they are to have foreign multinationals object to
discovery requests as being in violation of the GDPR, for the first time reversing the traditional
discovery pattern in transnational litigation of a U.S. federal court deciding whether to compel
discovery against a foreign multinational in violation of its foreign national blocking statute.
Courts may be hesitant to discount the GDPR’s importance in their balancing test if doing so will
entail serious financial penalties against U.S. corporations. As transnational litigation continues
to burgeon in the U.S. federal court system, and as U.S. federal court use of the Hague Evidence
Convention has become a last resort since the Supreme Court Aérospatiale decision, further
endorsed by the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations of the United States, understanding
Rule 44.1 more clearly and trying to effectuate its goal of independent judicial determination of
foreign law has become part of the everyday needs of adjudication and of harmonizing with the
rest of the world.
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I. Introduction

U.S. domestic court encounters with foreign law have often been characterized
by reluctance and even fictitious denial. For instance, an enduring doctrine of U.S. law, which
has been criticized as being “so unrealistic that it offends common sense,”1 allows courts to
conclude that U.S. and foreign law are identical if the parties do not raise foreign law,
precluding the need for the judge to apply foreign law or consider that it is in fact different
from U.S. law and does apply to the case.2 As a federal appellate court judge has stated, “[i]t is
strange indeed for a court to consciously apply the wrong law, based on the position taken by

*Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; Vice-President, International
Academy of Comparative Law. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine.
1 Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018,1039 (1941). Others
have referred to U.S. courts as “ducking and running” in the face of foreign law. Matthew J.
Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a
Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 896 (2011) (quoting Roger J. Miner,
The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 581 (1995).
2 See, e.g., Walter v. Netherlands Mead N.V., 514 F.2d 1130, 1137 n. 14 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied 423 U.S. 869; Parets V. Eaton Corp., 479 F.Supp. 512, 519 , n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1979); AngloAmerican Ins. Groip, P.L.C. v. CalFed, Inc., 899 F.Supp. 1070, 1077 (D.C. N.Y. 1995); Trabucco v.
Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 695 F. Supp. 2d 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Mazamare v. Winfrey, 693 F.Supp.2d
442 (E.D.Pa. 2010); Incubadora Mexicana, SA de CV v. Zoetis, Inc., 116 F. Supp.3d 519, 526 (E.D.
Pa. 2015); Sagaan Devs. & Trading Ltd. V. Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt., 2013 WL 2250793, *4, n. 10
(S.D. Fla. 20130; 2018 WL Taglieri v. Monasky, 2018 WL 757037, *12-13 (N.D. Ohio 2018); Pet
Food Exp., Ltd. V. Royal Canin USA Inc., 2010 W.L. 58973 (N.D. Cal. 2010); G and G Productions
LLC v. Rusic, 902 F. 3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2018); Stardust Monte-Carlo. S.A.R.L. v. Diamond
Quasar Jewelry, Inc., 2018 WL 1027754 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), *3; Pavlick v. Advance Stores Co., 2013
WL 1100679 (E.D. Pa. 2013) *1, n. 1.
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the parties, while acknowledging a discretionary authority to apply the right law.”3 More recent
analysis refers to sweeping “legal isolationism.”4
When Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 was enacted in 1966, its drafters assumed
that U.S. judges would progressively lose their fear of foreign law in the process of their newly
enhanced authority to determine it,5 and that henceforth they would take an active role in
ascertaining foreign law, rather than merely allowing the parties to explain it: “a judicial
practice of … refusing to engage in research or to assist or direct counsel would be inconsistent
with one of the rule’s basic premises.”6 The subject of this article concerns how these
predictions are being borne out and why, and what we might realistically aspire to do in dealing
with ongoing unresolved issues as U.S. judges increasingly find themselves faced with foreign
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Miner, supra note [1], at 583. Miner lists a number of other “fictitious presumpions”
concerning foreign law (quoting Yolanda M. Morentin, Note, Failure to Prove Foreign Law in
U.S. Courts,1988 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 228, 232 (“that the foreign law is the same as the
forum’s common law, that the foreign law is identical to the forum law, that foreign law is
based on generally recognized principles of civilized nations … and that the party by not proving
foreign law has essentially acquiesced to the forum law.”). Sparkling and Lanyi note the
converse, equally irrational situation that judges will agree to apply foreign law if both parties
stipulate to it, even if it is inapposite. John G. Sparkling & George R. Lanyi, Pleading and Proof of
Foreign Law in American Courts, 19 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 3, 10 (1983).
4 Pamela K. Bookman, Legal Isolationism, 67 STANFORD L. REV. 1081 (2015).
5 Rule 44.1 provides in its entirety that: “A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign
country’s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign law, the
court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s
determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.” Indeed, it was believed that
“judicial attitudes regarding the character of foreign law [had already] matured and that the
fear of the difficulties of ascertaining foreign law [had] substantially abated.” Arthur R. Miller,
Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard
Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV.613, 631 (1967). Miller was referring to the drafting of Article IV of the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, approved by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1962, which the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 44.1 say are “parallel
to the Rule.” Notes of Advisory Committee on Rule 44.1 (1966).
6 Miller, supra last note, at 661.
3

law. I argue that common-law attributes play a significant role in these encounters and
illustrate how often latent systemic and methodological issues hobble judicial understanding
and analysis.
The article proceeds by discussing Rule 44.1 in Parts II and III as an incomplete effort to
insert a civilian element into a common-law framework, discussing issues of fact and law within
the mechanisms of the U.S. trial through case law, and analyzing current challenges of foreign
expert reports and affidavits through the lens of challenges civilian foreign-law expert
presentations pose to common-law judges. Sections IV through VI explore the other major
areas in which U.S. judges are dealing with foreign law, forum non conveniens (Section IV), and
discovery (Sections V and VI). Section V includes an analysis of the 2018 European Union
General Data Protection Regulation. This new law clarifies the European perception of U.S.
discovery. It also has the potential for affecting federal court reasoning in transnational
discovery because the regulation’s digital age characteristics cause the party invoking this
foreign blocking statute against U.S. federal rules discovery compliance as likely to be a U.S.
multinational as a foreign corporation, reversing the traditional transnational discovery
paradigm. Section VI focuses on Section 1782 whose pattern is the converse of Rule 44.1’s
uneasy civilian intrusion into a common-law mechanism, inasmuch as Section 1782 allows U.S.
courts to grant federal rules discovery to foreign litigants in foreign proceedings anywhere in
the world, thus infusing the civilian world with common-law federal procedure. In Section VII, I
review current recommendations and make some of my own in light of my observations about
the nature of today’s challenges to U.S. courts and to the future. Section VIII offers conclusory
remarks.
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II. Foreign Law’s Incomplete Transition from Fact to Law
By encouraging and expecting judges to take the lead in ascertaining foreign law, Rule
44.1 introduced a distinctly foreign element into the issue of foreign law: it introduced a
method that is typical of civil-law countries where judges do not just determine foreign law but
also lead all aspects of the trial, overshadowing the parties as the primary player. Our commonlaw system of precedents casts a long shadow over judicial determinations, however.7 Arthur
Miller once said that precedents have a “pavlovian quality.”8 They have still more, inasmuch as
cases are an official, primary source of law in the U.S. legal system.9
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 44.1 recognize “the peculiar nature of the issue
of foreign law.”10 On the one hand, Rule 44.1 formalized a method that was being widely
practiced when it took the issue of foreign law away from the jury.11 But so far that did no more
than transform the issue from being tried by jury to being tried by bench, a change that would
not create an unfamiliar situation for common-law judges.12 The harder part was the next step

7

See infra, notes [ - ] and surrounding text.
See Miller, supra note [3], at 618. He was referring in particular to precedents which said that
foreign law was a question of fact.
9 See generally, EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2d ed. 2013) (University of
Chicago Press 1949); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (11th ed. 2018) (1st ed. 1930
copyrighted by K.N. Llewellyn).
10 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rule 44.1 (1966).
11 See Miller, supra note [], on the fact that this was already the common practice in state and
federal courts.
12 But see John R. Brown, 44.1 Ways to Prove Foreign Law, 9 MAR. LAW. 179, 194 (1984) (“Rule
44.1 is deliberately silent on whether the judge or the jury should determine the foreign law,
because such an allocation would exceed the rulemakers' authority, and might infringe upon
the constitutional right to a jury trial in federal civil cases. However, federal judges have
decided foreign law issues in civil cases without recourse to a jury both before and since 1966.”)
8
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of expecting a transformation in the common-law role of the judge from regulating the two
parties as an umpire to becoming their guide and leader, or even replacing them entirely, as
Rule 44.1 also allows. Today, more than half a century after the enactment of Rule 44.1, a key
question is if Rule 44.1 on its own was, or reasonably could have been expected to be,
successful in making foreign law become an issue of law within the framework of the commonlaw trial court.13
The rule does not oblige judges to do independent research to determine foreign law:
“The new rule refrains from imposing an obligation on the court to take ‘judicial notice’ of
foreign law because this would put an extreme burden on the court in many cases …”14
Inasmuch as a court does not engage in independent research and relies on party experts,
within the common-law trial system the issue of foreign law necessarily must be one of fact,
since it is a matter being presented adversarially by the parties, subject in its determination to
the superior credibility of the winning side, except that it has been defined by the rule as a
question of law and so cannot be a question of fact. Thus, tautologically, foreign law is an issue
of law because the rule says it is,15 but in practice, within the mechanisms of the common-law
trial, it takes on a factual role.

13

In his analysis of the marginalization of international law in U.S. courts, Gary Born attributes
the decline of international law in U.S. courts to coincide with the same period since Rule 44.1’s
adoption, and argues that the trend is against federal political policy. See Gary Born,
Marginalizing International Law, [Introduction/ p. 1], n. 200 and surrounding text (manuscript
on file with author).
14 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rule 44.1 (1966).
15 The rule’s mandate tends to be echoed throughout current cases. See, e.g., Katsoolis v. Liquid
Media Group, Ltd., 2019 WL 4735364, 3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Koshani v. Barton, 374 F.Supp. 695,
710 (E.D. Tenn. 2019); Alifax Holding SpA v. Alcor Scientific Inc., 357 F. Supp. 3d 147, 160 (D.R.I.
2019). For some exceptions, see infra notes [29-30].
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Rule 44.1’s definition has led many courts to conclude that a dispute as to foreign law
between opposing party experts cannot be a dispute about fact that could in and of itself justify
denial of a motion for summary judgment. Thus, in Matter of Arbitration Between Trans Chemical
Ltd. And China Nat. Machinery Import and Export Corp.,16 the court stated that “[d]ifferences of
opinion among experts on the content, applicability, or interpretation of foreign law do not
create a genuine issue as to any material fact under Rule 56.”17 Interestingly, both the Texas court
and the Fifth Circuit case it quoted, cited as support for this conclusion a law review article that
stated no more than the quite different proposition that Rule 44.1’s conferring law status on
foreign-law matters signifies that issues of foreign law are reviewable de novo on appeal.18
Subsequently, a federal district court in New York echoed the Fifth Circuit’s view with respect to
summary judgment19: “Differences of opinion between experts, as here, do not create issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment.”20
Wright and Miller approve of this position, but their presentation assumes the in fact
improbable independent judicial ascertainment of foreign law where party experts disagree
about it in the context of a motion for summary judgment:

16

978 F.Supp. 266 (S.D. Texas 1997).
Id. (citing Banco de Credito Indus., S.A. v. Tesoreria General, 990 F.2d 827, 838 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994)).
18 Brown, supra, note [9], at 194.
19 St. Pierre v. Dyer, 21 F.Supp. 2d 138 (D.N.Y., 1998), vacated on other grounds, 208 F.3d 394
(2d Cir. 2000).
20Id., at 143 (citing to Matter of the Arbitration Between Trans Chem. Ltd. and China Nat'l Mach.
Import & Export Corp., 978 F.Supp. 266, 275 (S.D.Tex.1997); United States v. BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg), S.A., 977 F.Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C.1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 637, 1998 WL 388793 (D.C.Cir.
May 6, 1998)); accord, Sanofi-Aventis LLC v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 2018 WL 2272773
(D.Del. 2018), *4; Immobilaria Axial, S.A. de C.V. v. Robles Int. Servs., 2010 WL 290091, *3 (W.D.
Tex. 2010).
17
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If the proof before the district court on a summary judgment motion is not harmonious
… the court should request a further showing by counsel, or engage in its own research,
or direct that a hearing be held, with or without oral testimony, to resolve the issue. A
combination of these courses will ensure as detailed a foreign-law presentation as might
be anticipated at a full trial on the merits. Once foreign law is ascertained to the judge's
satisfaction, the court should proceed to decide the summary judgment motion as it
would in any other context.21
It is almost a foregone conclusion in the U.S. adversarial common-law system that party
experts will have differing views of the foreign law. In such cases, unless the court does undertake
an independent determination of the foreign law, which, for many reasons, is unlikely,22
concluding that the matter of battling experts does not present an issue of fact is difficult to
maintain within common-law legal reasoning.23 Wright and Miller also try to bring a solution to
the summary judgment dilemma for the many U.S. judges who do not engage in independent
comparative legal analysis by suggesting that they may treat adversarial expert reports on foreign
law as they would handle a trial, by resolving the credibility issue judicially, as at “a full trial on

21

WRIGHT & MILLER, § 2444 Federal Practice and Procedure, in FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(emphasis added).
22 Stare decisis is one such reason. See infra, notes[131, 132], and surrounding text; and
Sections V and VI. In addition, we know that in practice U.S. judges generally rely on party
experts. See WRIGHT & MILLER, § 2444. See also Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research
in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L. J. 1263, 1304 (2007) (Where foreign law is concerned, judges
construe their ability to do investigate it independently as narrowly as they can or evade the
matter entirely); Peter Hay, The Use and Determination of Foreign law in Civil Litigation in the
United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 213, 217 (2014) (“the determination of the content of foreign
law … does not occur ex officio, except in a few isolated cases, but only upon party initiative.”)
(citations omitted); Estate of Figueroa v. Williams, 2007 WL 2127168, *2 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(“Although the Court may consider any relevant material or source under Rule 44.1, expert
testimony accompanied by extracts from foreign legal materials is the basic methos by which
foreign law is determined”).
23 See id. (supra notes [ - ], and surrounding text).
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the merits,”24 and that then they may proceed to rule on the motion for summary judgment,
once the trial is completed.25 But this returns the mechanism to the tautology noted earlier, since
the judges would be trying foreign-law issues as matters of fact, not as matters of law, as at a
bench trial, allowing the motion for summary judgment to be resolved on the superior credibility
of one of the two experts “as might be anticipated at a full trial on the merits,”26 and giving only
nominal deference to Rule 44.1’s stricture that foreign law is an issue of law.
The uneasy posture of foreign law as an issue of law where the court does not
undertake to ascertain it on its own, but, as is usually the case, relies on party experts, was
clearly visible in Sea Trade Maritime Corp. v. Coutsodontis.27 The court denied a motion for
summary judgment there, based on outstanding issues of material fact. It did not openly
categorize foreign law as one such issue of fact, quite on the contrary taking pains to note that
Rule 44.1 mandates that foreign law be an issue of law, yet it treated the foreign-law issue as an
issue of fact, not of law.28 It first noted that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 controls the
determination of foreign law in federal court, and authorizes the court to consider any relevant
material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”29 But the court then went on to contradict itself by
deciding that, “[a]lthough the Court's determination of foreign law is treated as a question of
law, Plaintiff’s submissions are insufficient for the Court to determine on a motion for summary

24

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note [18], at § 2444.
Id.
26 Id.
27 2012 WL 6097726 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) *1.
28 Id., and infra, note [28], and surrounding text.
29 Id. at *3.
25
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judgment the content of the applicable Liberian law.” 30 To make the matter still clearer, despite
the court’s earlier evocation of Rule 44.1’s mandate that foreign law be treated as an issue of
law, and after stating that the issue of foreign law was one of two reasons why it could not
grant the motion for summary judgment, and having given only two reasons for denial of
summary judgment, one of which was the foreign law issue, the court openly concluded that
the issue of foreign law was one of those outstanding issues of fact in the following manner:
“[T]he Court finds that there are factual issues to be tried and denies summary judgment,”31
The court’s use of the plural (“issues”) where foreign law was one of only two issues for its
denial of the summary judgment motion left no doubt that it was being treated as an issue of
fact.
For almost forty years after Rule 44.1 was enacted, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
both continued to treat issues of foreign law as issues of fact, and to ignore Rule 44.1’s
requirement that it not do so.32 The Southern District of New York did as well, stating in 1992,
more than a quarter of a century after Rule 44.1 had been adopted, that “[f]oreign law is a
question of fact which must be proved.”33 One commentator summarized this situation by
saying that “some federal courts still have not gotten the word” that Rule 44.1 has changed
foreign law from an issue of fact to one of law.34 It seems improbable that federal judges whose

30

Id., at *3 (citations omitted).
Id. (Emphasis added).
32 Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 489 n. 10 (3d Cir. 2001) (“In general, foreign law is treated
as a fact that must be proven by the parties.”)
33 Weiss v. Glemp, 792 F. Supp. 215, 229 (S.D. N.Y.) (discussed in Miner, supra note [1], at 584).
34 Miner, supra note [1], at 584. One such court was the Fourth Circuit in 2013: (“a district
court's application of foreign law is a factual matter …” DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 714
31
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practices increasingly deal with Rule 44.1 remain unaware of it. Federal judges excel in their
knowledge of civil procedure, dealing with it as they do every day and in each and every case. A
more plausible explanation for such an otherwise inexplicable error is more likely to be the way
that issues of foreign law have been playing out in their courtrooms, as was illustrated by Sea
Trade Maritime, where there was an open contrast between the judge’s paying tribute to the
language of Rule 44.1 but not to its substance, as though common-law realities had gotten the
better of a civilian intruder.
Foreign law’s uneasy accommodation as an issue of law within the common-law
framework no doubt is among the invisible reasons that dealing with the foreign law which they
need to understand and resolve can be difficult for U.S. judges, and arguably is as, or even
more, of a stumbling block to resolving the pressing challenges brought by transnational cases
than the more obvious issues of accessing foreign law without sufficient training in
understanding it or having sufficient, effective research resources at ready disposal.35
Significantly, where the transition to issue of law does not require disturbing common-law
methodology, Rule 44.1’s implementation has been smoother. For example, issues of foreign
law are successfully treated as issues of law for de novo review by appellate courts,36 as befits

F.3d 796, 807-8 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis supplied) ( citing Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman,
Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 345 (8th Cir. 1983.)

35

See The Hon. Malcolm R. Wilkey, Transnational Adjudication: A View from the Bench, 18 INT’L.
LAWYER 541, 543 (1984).
36 E.g., U.S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1106; Alameda Films
S.A. de CV v Authors Rights Restoration Corp, 331 F.3d 472 (5th Cir 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S.
1048.
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all issues of law on appellate review. The practice of de novo appellate review of issues of law
is firmly entrenched in the common-law system and therefore causes no more disruption to it,
or difficulty in implementation to the U.S. judge than, at the trial court level, did Rule 44.1’s
transition of foreign law from an issue for a jury trial to an issue for a bench trial.37
To explain the de novo appeal of foreign-law issues, the Second Circuit has said that, in
cases dealing with foreign-law expert testimony, “it is not the credibility of the experts that is at
issue, it is the persuasive force of the opinions they expressed.”38 The court meant by this that,
“[e]ven though the District Court heard live testimony from experts from both sides, that
Court's opportunity to assess the witnesses' demeanor provides no basis for a reviewing court
to defer to the trier's ruling on the content of foreign law,”39 thus justifying de novo review on
appeal by belying the idea that witness credibility ever played or plays a role. The appellate
court then proceeded to discuss the content of the contradictory experts’ reports and to
explain why it found one more persuasive than the other.40 Whether this account of what
transpired at the trial court level is actually accurate may be dubious, but that is of no import in
terms of the appellate court’s ability to initiate a de novo review within the common-law
structure that would bear every legitimate earmark of any other customary review on appeal
where the court has de novo review powers.
Rule 44.1 makes clear that judges may raise foreign law’s applicability on their own
initiative where neither party has raised it. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 44.1 say

37

See supra note [8] and surrounding text.
Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1998).
39 Id.
40 Id. Accord, Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
38Itar-Tass
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“[t]here is no requirement that the court give formal notice to the parties of its intention to
engage in its own research on an issue of foreign law which has been raised by them, or of its
intention to raise and determine independently an issue not raised by them.” 41 Such an
arrangement, although not unique to common-law trials, where judges have the power to raise
matters parties do not plead, is highly unusual in the common-law system which expects the
adversaries to raise every matter of legal substance to be pleaded. Accordingly, some courts
continue to this day to require that the parties plead foreign law. A recent Note traces the
post-Rule 44.1 development of this requirement in the Fifth and Third Circuit Courts of
Appeal,42 and other courts also do so.43 Notably, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the burden of
ascertaining foreign law independently of the parties, making it clear that that “the information
burden [with respect to foreign law] remains at all times on the party invoking foreign law,” 44
and further clarifying and emphasizing that parties “may get saved by the court’s own research
efforts, but if the task is too great the court may fall back on some other law (usually forum law)
as presumptively controlling,”45 and characterizing completely independent judicial
ascertainment of foreign law in the following manner: “Even in the internet age, it would put an
extraordinary burden on the court if parties could nakedly invoke foreign law and then delegate
the job of figuring it out to the judge and her clerks.”46

41

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rule 44.1 (1966).
See Alejandro J. Garcia, Lex Incognita No Longer: Making Foreign Law Less Foreign to Federal
Courts, 108 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1027, 1047 – 1051 (2020).
43 See, e.g., Thackurdeen v. Duke University, 2018 WL 1478131 (M.D.N.Ca. 2018) *7.
44 G and G Productions LLC v. Rusic, 902 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting STEVEN S. GENSLER,
1 FED. R. OF CIV. P. RULES AND COMMENTARY, Rule 44.1 (2018).
45 Id. (emphasis in original).
46 Id.
42
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Such an idea of making the judicial burden truly active and independent of the parties,
although endorsed by the Seventh and Second Circuits, is in every way anathema to traditional
common-law habits. While U.S. judges have clerks, generally untrained in foreign law or
languages and unable to access foreign law adequately,47 judges do not have anything
comparable to their civilian brethren: the teams of legal comparatists that a similarly situated
French judge would have at her disposal48 to make such a process part of the normal task of the
judge without its becoming and “extraordinary burden,” as well as the historical tradition in
Germany which in one way or another since the Middle Ages has been linking judges to the
opinions of academics.49 It is understandable that the Ninth Circuit would feel exasperated at
the suggestion that it would be called upon to decipher the intricacies of an Italian statute of
limitation under Rule 44.1 and perhaps equally understandable that, in assessing the need of
U.S. courts to address foreign law due to increasing globalization, the drafters of Rule 44.1 did

47

On the grave difficulties of doing adequate research in foreign law in the U.S., see Pierre
Legrand, Proof of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: A Critique of Epistemic Hubris, 8 J. COMP. L. 343,
355 (2008); Loren Turner, Buried Treasure: Excavating Foreign Law from Civil Pleadings Filed in
U.S. Federal Courts, 47 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 22 (2019). In my own experience, with respect to
French law, it is practically impossible to do adequate legal research from the United States
without obtaining access to the computer-based legal data to which French universitities
subscribe, comparable to WestLaw or Lexis-Nexis for U.S. law. Few U.S. law schools subscribe to
it due to its not being cost effective, given the small number of American faculty able to do
research in French.
48 I base this in particular on conversations several years ago with President Judge Guy Canivet
about how the judges of his court, France’s Cour de cassation, ascertained foreign law, and on
numerous other conversations with French judges and jurists.
49 For the evolution of this tradition in the civilian world in general and in Germany in particular,
see Stefan Vogenauer, An Empire of Light? Lawmaking and Learning in the History of German
Law, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 481 (2005; on the particular procedure called the Aktenversendung, see
Engelbert Klugkist, Die Aktenversendung an Juristenfakultäten: Ein gemeinsames Kapitel aus der
Geschichte des deutschen Prozeßrechts und der deutschen Universitäten, 5/6 JURISTENZEITUNG
156 (1967).
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not foresee the ways in which the new judicial undertaking they envisaged would confront and
be impeded by common-law traditions and realities.
In another 2018 case, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
applied North Carolina law, not because foreign law was inapplicable, but because it held that
the parties had the burden of raising it, and in default thereof, the court should apply the law of
the forum without further inquiry:
[T]he party claiming foreign law applies carries both the burden of raising the
issue that foreign law may apply in an action and the burden of proving foreign
law to enable the district court to apply it in a particular case. Where a party
fails to satisfy either burden, the district court should apply the forum state's
law. [W]here the parties do not satisfy both of these burdens, the law of the
forum will apply50
Similarly, in Oparugo V. Watts,51 the District Court for the District of Columbia asserted that
“where both parties have failed to prove foreign law, the forum may say that the parties have
acquiesced in the application of the local law of the forum.”52

A. Whose Interpretation of Foreign Law: The Role of Foreign Precedent

50

Id. at *7, internal citations and quotation marks omitted, citing Baker v. Booz Allen Hamilton,
Inc., 358 F. App’x 476, 481 (4th Cir., 2009); Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 F. Supp. 2d 442 (E.D. Pa.
2010); and Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Sea Phoenix, 447 F.3d 212, 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).
51 884 A.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2005).
52 Id. at 71. Accord, Minibea Ltd. V. Papst, 444 F.Supp.2d 68, 186 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting id., and
citing 9 MOORE’S FED. PRACTICE § 44.104 [3] -15 (2002 ed.; and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §
136, cmt h (1971). It should be noted that, read in context, the Restatement does not support
this reading. Wright and Miller have commented as follows on this use of the Restatement:
“The Restatement of Conflict of Laws often is used to support the erroneous claim that the
court has no obligation to determine foreign law. Although the language of the Restatement
can be read in this manner, it closely tracks the language of Rule 44.1.”) WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note [18], at § 2441, n. 9.60.
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A question rarely considered is whose understanding of foreign law U.S. judges should
give under Rule 44.1 where judges do not rely on party experts: namely, their own or that of
foreign judges interpreting their own legislation. When the Supreme Court decided in Animal
Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Science Pharmaceutical Co.53 that U.S. judges should
accord no more than “substantial weight”54 to the views expressed by a foreign government
which expresses its opinion of the law of its country within the context of a case being tried in
the United States, it was deciding a different question, as it was when it concluded that caution
was needed vis-à-vis such foreign government views.55 The Animal Science issue is analogous to
the discussion below concerning whether suggested referrals of foreign-law issues to foreign
courts might be cause for similar caution.56 In this section, by contrast, the question concerns
U.S. judges’ reliance on foreign courts’ internal applications of and conclusions about their own
law before the case at bar has been instituted in the U.S. court, and no impetus for a foreign
court or governmental institution to opine on the interests of the foreign party could have
arisen.
Most non common-law legal systems do not consider precedents to be primary sources
of law, and thus in principle do not themselves rely on other courts’ interpretation of the law

53

138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
Id. at 1872.
55 Id. at 1873 (“a federal court is neither bound to adopt the foreign government's
characterization nor required to ignore other relevant materials. When a foreign government
makes conflicting statements or, as here, offers an account in the context of litigation, there
may be cause for caution in evaluating the foreign government's submission.”) (Internal
reference omitted).
56 See infra notes [243 – 245] and surrounding text.
54
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when deciding cases.57 Should U.S. judges then rely on foreign judges’ interpretations of the
relevant foreign law in foreign cases when judges in that country would not do so themselves?
This issue relates philosophically to the point Clermont raises concerning “when a decision
maker should decide for itself and when it should itself follow the dictates of another.”58
Significantly, when civil-law judges interpret foreign law, they sometimes prioritize their own
views of foreign law over those of even the supreme court of a foreign court, 59 even though a
repeated number of consistent high court rulings also take on precedential effect in those
civilian systems.60 Rule 44.1 gives U.S. judges leeway to do the same.61 But this means U.S.
judges would need to trust to their understanding of a foreign country’s law in all of its
complexity within the vast system of interconnections that any given law represents and

57

For these and many other differences between the common- and civil-law systems, see
generally, Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COL. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001).
58 Kevin M. Clermont, Degrees of Deference: Applying vs Adopting Another Sovereign Law, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 243, 249 (2018) (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 57-62 (1988)).
59 Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L.J. 1018,1033 (1941). See
also Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening
the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 925 (2011) (suggesting
in the context of certifying issues of foreign law to foreign courts that U.S. judges should accord
no more than “substantial deference” to their foreign brethren).
60 In France, this is the doctrine known as jurisprudence constante. See, e.g., Hon. Robert L.
Henry, Jurisprudence Constante and Stare Decisis Contrasted, 15 AM. BAR. ASS. J. 11 (1929),
available at https://www-jstororg.pitt.idm.oclc.org/stable/25707546?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (last visited July 24,
2020). In Germany, the doctrine is known as feststehende Rechtsprechung. See, e.g., Burke
Shartel & Hans Julius Wolff, Civil Justice in Germany, 42 MICH. L. REV. 863, 867 (1944). The Italian
doctrine, a cognate of the French one, giurisprudenza constante, is described in Francesco
Mazzotta, Precedents in Italian Law, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT’L. L. 121, 128 (2000).
61 See supra, note [3], for the text of the rule.
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connotes in its socio-historico-political semiosis. It is a rare judge who will feel able to meet
such a challenge, and a still rarer one who will be able to meet it effectively.
The next sections analyze various alternative Rule 44.1 options for the judicial
ascertainment of foreign law. The first option analyzed is the expert on foreign law. Like the
previous section concerning issues of fact versus issues of law, the foreign-law expert issue also
has implications for the common-law method of adjudication.
III. Experts
A. Party and Court Experts
As the Seventh Circuit has made clear, U.S. courts may be skeptical of party experts’
rendition of foreign law to the extent they are mutually contradictory and seem to be part of
advocacy rather than of an objective portrayal of foreign law.62 What one may describe as
inherent credibility questions of the party expert on foreign law is shared with party experts on
issues unrelated to foreign law, but is particularly fraught in the area of foreign law if the judge
has no independent basis for forming an opinion. Although experts on foreign law in principle
are allowed only to explain the foreign law, and not to apply it to the case at hand or to reach

62

Bodum U.S.A., Inc v. La Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2010); Sunstar Inc. v. Alberta
Culver Co., 586 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2009). For a critique of the majority opinions in Bodum and
approval of the concurrence, see Legrand, supra note []. See also Curran, U.S. Discovery in A
Transational and Digital Age, 51 AKRON L. REv. 857, 877- 878 (further analysis of Bodum).
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conclusions, in reality experts generally do apply the law to the legal issues to describe how the
case would come out under that law.63
While some courts strike foreign-law expert reports for drawing such conclusions, the
tendency is to permit them, and, indeed, some courts seem critical of experts who fail to apply
foreign law to the case.64 In Lithuanian Commerce Corp., Ltd. V. Sara Lee Hosiery,65 the court
described a foreign-law expert’s conclusory statements as unproblematic because, under Rule
44.1, they were for the judge to assess; they would not go before a jury, and therefore were
not subject to the Daubert rule.66 Similarly, in Excel Fortress Limited v. Wilhelm,67 the court
denied a motion to strike a foreign-law expert’s report for stating legal conclusions, noting that
both Second and Ninth Circuit courts had established that Rule 44.1 permitted this:
Although it is true that Dr. Yang offers legal conclusions (i.e., the Chinese contract is
enforceable) and purports to apply the law to the facts (i.e., Dr. Li was required, under
the contract, to give 60 days' notice before leaving)—things that experts are usually
prohibited from doing—a different set of rules and standards apply when foreign law is
at issue[...] For this reason, the Ninth Circuit and other courts have concluded an expert
may, under Rule 44.1, opine on the ultimate issue of whether a contract is enforceable
under foreign law[:] … [a] court may ... consider a foreign law expert’s opinion even on
ultimate legal conclusions.68

63

See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note [18], at § 2444 (“an expert witness in foreign law is to aid the
court in determining the content of the applicable foreign law, not to apply the law to the facts
of the case”); infra, notes 56 - 64 and surrounding text.
64 See G and G Productions, 902 F.3d at 945, n. 3.
65 177 F.R.D. 45, 264 (D.N.J. 1997).
66 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (setting a
standard for general expert testimony admissibility).
67 2019 WL 163252 *3 (D. Ariz. 2019) (quoting Winn v. Schaefer, 499 F. Supp.2d 390, 396 n. 28
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) and citing Universe Sales Co., Ltd. V. Silver Castle, Ltd., 182 F.3d 1036, 1038-39
(9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68 Id.
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The court added that, although it would not strike the expert’s report, it also need not
“uncritically accept” it.69
Other courts reject the standard of allowing experts on foreign law to express legal
conclusions. In Minibea, Ltd. v. Papst, the District Court for the District of Columbia stated that
“[t]he Court does not credit Dr. Ann's conclusory statement that Papst Licensing should be held
to Papst Motoren's contract on these facts. The purpose of expert testimony such as that of Dr.
Ann is to aid the court in determining the content of the applicable foreign law—not to apply it
to the facts of the case.”70 Along the same lines, the United States District Court for the District
of Idaho specified in Gibson v. Credit Suisse, AG. that the plaintiffs’ expert on Bahamian law
would be permitted to testify only “to the extent of discussing Bahamian standards, not legal
conclusions.”71 In Siswanto v. Airbus Americas, Inc.,72 the court denied a motion to strike, but
said “the Court will disregard [the foreign law expert’s] declaration “to the extent the report
[extends] beyond providing an analysis of [Indonesian] law, and [is] offered to assist the fact
finder as to which facts to find.”73

69

Id.
444 F.Supp.2d 68, 182 (D.D.C. 2006); see also id. for the court’s frustration with German law
expert, Dr. Ann’s, failure to explain the statements he made in his report about the BGB, the
German Civil Code, merely citing to a Code Commentary without, however, entering into the
particular factors relevant for German court determination of case outcomes, despite the fact
that a presentation such as Dr. Ann had made would have been sufficient in a German expert
report such as Dr. Ann may have been accustomed to making or would have been likely to have
as his model.
71 2010 WL 1904773 (D. Idaho 2010) *5, n.4.
72 2016 WL 7174860 (N.D. Ill., 2016) *5.
73 Id., quoting in part Labuda v. Schmidt, 2005 WL 2290247, *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
70
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The courts’ frustrations on expert partisanship may have been most strikingly expressed
by the Seventh Circuit in Bodum and Sunstar, but it can be sensed in many cases throughout the
various circuits, as well as in Wright and Miller’s rendition of proving foreign law, which states
that an impetus to having the courts ascertain foreign law independently was precisely to
overcome the problem of expert partisanship: “All too often counsel will do an inadequate job
of researching and presenting foreign law or will attempt to prove it in such a partisan fashion
that the court is obliged to go beyond their offerings… [I]t must be remembered that one of
the policies inherent in Rule 44.1 is that whenever possible issues of foreign law should be
resolved on their merits and on the basis of a full evaluation of the available materials. To
effectuate this policy, the court is obliged to take an active role in the process of ascertaining
foreign law.”74
It has been suggested as a remedy to the partisanship of the party expert that courts
appoint their own, presumably objective experts.75 This is the practice in civil-law countries, but
it is not a panacea even there. Within those systems, criticisms of various kinds have been

74

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note [18], at § 2444 (emphasis added); accord, Twohy v. First Nat.
Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Medline Industries Inc. v. Maersk
Medical Ltd., 230 F.Supp.2d 857, 871, n. 5 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (court was obliged to do independent
research on foreign law because of partisanship of expert presentations).
75 See Peter Hay, The Use and Determination of Foreign law in Civil Litigation in the United
States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 213, 230-231 (2014); Matthew J. Wilson, supra note 1, at 927-933;
Miner, supra note [1], at 588; Louise Ellen Teitz, Determining and Applying Foreign Law: The
Increasing Need for Cross-Border Cooperation, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1081, 1099 (2013)
(mentioning the court-appointed expert as efficacious but increasingly unrealistic as court
budgets grow more strained. It should be noted, however, that Federal Rule of Evidence 706
places the burden of paying for the court-appointed expert on the parties to the extent the
judge so chooses. See Fed. R. Evid. 706 (c), “Compensation” [is to be provided ] “by the parties
in the proportion and at the time that the court directs--and the compensation is then charged
like other costs.”)
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levelled at the manner in which experts are selected and at the level of their performance.76
More fundamentally, the court expert may also sit uneasily within the U.S. common-law
system.77 Judge Douglas Ginsburg opposes judicial experts who would not be subject to party
cross-examination as an institution that would damage the adversarial system by denying the
parties an equal opportunity to prevail.78 Ginsburg is concerned that judges would be
delegating their constitutional obligation to decide to experts they appoint who might advise
them ex parte:
In a complex case, the judges may defer substantially to the explanations they receive
from the court-appointed expert; indeed, there would be little point in appointing an
expert if the judges did not do so. These experts are not authorized under Article III of
the Constitution to exercise the “judicial Power of the United States”; they are neither
subject to the nomination and confirmation process nor vested with the life tenure and
salary protections deemed critical to the independence of the judiciary, yet they would
influence the outcome of cases and may effectively decide them.79
Ginsburg took pains to note that he was addressing court-appointed experts outside Federal Rule
of Evidence 706, who would not be subject to party cross-examination,80 but, even where Rule
706 applies, Ginsburg’s concerns still may be apposite. It has been noted, for example, that,
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For a comparative analysis of French and U.S. experts, including the insight that the parties
do not have equal say in French proceedings, as well as that lying is not considered as serious
an infraction in France as in the United States, and, finally, that experts in France form a small,
club-like group of people who may tend not to be at the forefront of their fields as they are
virtually assured of being chosen for future expert needs of courts once they are inscribed on
judicial expert registers, see Antoine Garapon, L’expertise française sous le regard international,
in 2007 COUR DE CASSATION, available at
https://www.courdecassation.fr/colloques_activites_formation_4/2007_2254/aise_sous_1091
1.html (last visited July 24, 2020).
77 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Appellate Courts and Independent Experts, 60 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 303,
314-318 (2010).
78 Id., at 314.
79 Id., at 315.
80 Id., at 314 - 315.
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where the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida81 appointed its own expert in
foreign law, “the court accept[ed] the expert’s findings in toto”82 and that “there [was] no
indication that the court did any research outside the expert’s report .…”83 Although the courtappointed expert for foreign law has been urged on the courts for numerous years,84 with rare
exceptions U.S. courts have not sought this solution in the area of foreign law.85 Indeed, Judge
Ginsburg’s concerns about court-appointed experts appear to be widely echoed in the state court
judicial surveys conducted and collected by Cheng, which reflect, as one of two principal judicial
concerns, that court-appointed experts in any area violate “traditional adversarial values.”86
Where a party seeks to argue that the court apply foreign law, it may even advocate the use of a
court-appointed expert or master in order to fight dismissal, as in Stoyas v. Toshiba,87 where the
lower court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds.
Not only do they rarely appoint their own experts, but even today many U.S. courts
maintain that they have no duty to determine foreign law at all, sometimes citing to the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws for this proposition.88 In practice, the two most common ways
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The case was United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d
1367. (S.D. Fla. 2003).
82 Garcia, supra note [30], at 1053.
83 Id.
84 See supra note [65] (sources suggesting court experts).
85 Hay, supra note [19], at 221; Ginsburg, supra note [67], at 309, n. 35, and sources cited
therein. See infra note [81], and sources cited therein.
86 Cheng, supra note [19], at 1280. The other concern related to the difficulty of accuracy. See
id. at 1281 – 82.
87 191 F. Supp.3d 1080,1099 (C.D. Ca. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 896 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.
2018).
88 See, e.g., In re Spring Ford Industries, Inc., 2004 WL 1291223, *3, n. 5 (Bankr., E.D.Pa. 2004);
Minebea Co., Ltd. V. Papst, 444 F.Supp.2d 68, 185 (D.D.C. 2006); Hammerl v. Acer Europe, S.A.
2009 WL 30130, *8 (N.D.Cal. 2009). See also Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 431 (10th Cir.
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U.S courts resolve the issue of foreign law are (1) not to apply it, whether by concluding that it
does not apply under a conflicts analysis or by dismissing the case on forum non conveniens
grounds;89 or (2) to rely on party experts in what at best makes of foreign law a mixed issue of
fact and law.90 As others have suggested, where the courts entertain foreign law, “[w]ritten or
oral [party]expert testimony accompanied by extracts from various kinds of legal materials
probably will continue to be the basic mode of proving foreign law.”91
The next section explores a dimension of the foreign-law expert in U.S. courts that is
pervasive: limits of communication across legal systems.

B. Communicating Between Systems of Signs: Ships Passing in the Night
“Remember, the knowledge of expert counsel has no influence in the decision unless
it is clearly communicated to the court.”
- The Hon. Malcom R. Wilkey92
There are two levels at which the foreign-law expert faces communication challenges. The
first is to communicate the meaning of particulars of foreign law that are not separable from the
vast networks to which they are attached in their own legal order, and which are not translatable

2006) (remanding foreign law issue for proof by parties at trial court level on reasoning that
Rule 44.1 granted it only “some discretion to determine ourselves what Swiss law provides…”,
and that such independent judicial determination of the foreign law would not constitute the
best practice). (Emphasis added). See note [38] for Wright and Miller’s and my own criticism of
this reading of the Restatement of Conflicts.
89 See infra, Section IV.
90 See supra notes [-- - --] and surrounding text (foreign law still an issue of fact).
91 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note [18], at § 2444. Accord, e.g., Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberta Culver Co.,
586 F.3d 487, 495 (7th Cir. 2009) (“that is the route followed in most cases.”); Siswanto v. Airbus
Americas, Inc., 2016 WL 7178460, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Leibovitch v. Syrian Arab Republic,
25 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
92 The Hon. Malcolm R. Wilkey, Transnational Adjudication: A View from the Bench, 18 INT’L.
LAWYER 541, 542 (1984).
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by way of English legal terms that emanate from the context of the U.S., British or other commonlaw legal system. Even as simple a word as “trial” or “contract” does not convey the meaning of
a French “procès” or “contrat”.93 The legal phenomena are different. In a contract issue of some
sophistication, how deeply within a foreign legal system should a foreign legal expert go in order
to convey everything necessary to the U.S. judge? A dissertation rather than an expert report
arguably would be required. An equally apt question is whether a foreign expert on the foreign
law would even be aware that a U.S. judge’s understanding of the foreign law may be far afield
of the foreign expert’s intended meaning. To what extent are foreign experts aware of the gulf
that may separate the English terms they use for the legal phenomena in their legal order that
they describe? The U.S. understanding of the English terms need not be any better understood
by the foreign expert than the U.S. judge’s understanding of the foreign legal phenomena
described in the foreign expert’s report.
Moreover, to the extent that foreign legal experts explain the law of their country to
U.S. judges without referring to caselaw, U.S. judges may tend to be skeptical of the expert’s
statements and conclusions, even though, within the foreign legal system, it may not be
customary to cite to cases. Thus, in Carlisle Ventures, Inc. v. Banco Espanol de Credito,94 the
Second Circuit rejected the expert report of a Spanish attorney and former law professor it
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For a portrayal of my general views on the issue of communicating across legal orders, see,
e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S.
Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (199 ); and Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law
and Language, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (ed.s Matthias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann, 681 – 709 (2d ed., 2019) For a deep inquiry into the challenges of language and
translation to law, see FRANÇOIS OST, TRADUIRE (2009).
94 176 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 1999).
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characterized as “prominent” because the report “cite[d] no Spanish cases that employ this
particular remedy….” Similarly, In Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Henkel Ag & Co., an Eastern
District Court of Michigan judge rejected a German expert’s interpretation of a German statute
where the expert “did not cite any judicial decision…,”95 and was dismissive of the expert’s
citation to other sources even though they were authoritative within the German legal
system.96
The second communication problem concerns the manner in which the expert report is
drafted. Foreign law experts may tend to present an expert report as they would in their native
country; namely, with less concern about avoiding what would seem to a U.S. legal reader like
sweeping, conclusory statements made with insufficient buttressing legal authority. The U.S.
judge generally expects all legal writing to be punctilious in providing continuous, pervasive
cited legal authority of an explicit and verifiable nature for each and every statement building
up to any conclusion, as is necessary to justify legal views based on inductive reasoning, the
reasoning of common-law legal systems.97 The civilian law expert may be inclined to base
statements on cited Code articles that do not provide the U.S. judge with evident legal support,
but would garner credence in the expert’s native system where legal reasoning is deductive,
where law is organized according to different systemic rules and divisions, and, equally
importantly, where the norm is for the expert to be court-appointed and able to rely on
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290 F. Supp. 3d 681, 689 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
See id.
97 On the differences between the two legal orders, and especially the punctilious, individual
fact-oriented, detailed nature of the common law in contrast to the converse civilian
methodology which I have analogized to attributes of Romanticism versus the Enlightenment,
see Curran, 7 COLUM. J. EUR L. 63, supra note [46].
96
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considerably more credibility derived from that status.98 Thus, in Twohy v. First Nat. Bank of
Chicago,99 the Seventh Circuit rejected the expert reports of Spanish lawyers on Spanish law as
inadequate on the ground that those “experts, attorneys practicing in Spain, opined from their
personal knowledge that plaintiff's action is barred under Spanish law … Something more
concrete might have been expected of defendant, and plaintiff has been quick to point out the
lack of discussion of substantive law within and the conclusory nature of defendant's
affidavits.”100
The concrete and the specific that the judge thought “might have been expected” are,
however, the hallmarks of the common-law legal analysis, while the general and deductive are
those of civil-law analysis, the system of the foreign-law legal expert. Spanish lawyers might not
be expected or have been trained to submit a presentation of Spanish law in in their own
country in the manner that the U.S. common-law judge expected. Relatedly, the conclusory
nature of expert reports is commonplace to civilian lawyer experts, although a frequent cause
of U.S. judicial displeasure.101 While U.S. judges may take such reports to be legally deficient on
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On such systemic divisions and categories in French contract law in particular and their
contrasts with British law that came as a shock to those on both British and French legal teams
working jointly on Eurotunnel contracts, see Jean-François Guillemin, le Tunnel sous la Manche:
confrontation et fusion permanente de deux cultures juridiques réputées antagonistes, 2 R. I. D.
C. 403 (1995).
99 758 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985).
100 Id., at 1193. See also infra note [192] for another form of miscommunication between
foreign expert and judge.
101 See supra, notes [60-61], and surrounding text; and supra notes [83 – 87], and surrounding
text.
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the basis of lacking in adequate legal support from a common-law perspective, as seen
earlier,102 it is a characteristic style of experts in at least some civilian countries.103
Rule 44.1 allows experts on foreign law to be American lawyers and scholars: “[T]he
expert need not even be admitted to practice in the country whose law is at issue.”104 Such
common-law experts are best positioned to address U.S. judges in a way that judges understand
but, unless they are adept comparatists steeped in the foreign law, which by force also means
the foreign language, society, culture and history that the foreign law is part of, American lawyers
and scholars are least prepared to understand the foreign law within its own context. This means,
on the whole, that foreign-law experts on civilian law who can accomplish their task well and
communicate effectively to U.S. judges are few and far between.105
An exception to this rule occurred in a case in which a U.S. court was relying on experts
and where the level, if any, of its independent assessment was not clear, but where it
thoughtfully considered and rejected foreign court decisions.106 In Films by Jove, Inc. v.
Berov,107 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York rejected both post-Soviet
Russian court interpretations of Soviet Russian law and prior French court interpretations of
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See id.
In addition to the caselaw presented here reflecting such U.S. judicial reaction, see id., this
has been the experience of the author when serving as a foreign-law expert in the civil law.
104 Neither the Rule itself nor the Notes of the Advisory Committee notes restrict foreign-law
experts in this way. Accord,WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note [18], §2444.
105 A notable exception was the international law professor expert on foreign law (Professor
Paul Stephen of the University of Virginia Law School) whose report the court referred to at
length and relied on in Jove. See supra notes [98 - 101], and surrounding text.
106 Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 -175 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
107 Id.
103
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that law.108 The U.S. court’s touched on aspects of France and Russia’s legal systems, including
the lack of stare decisis in civil-law systems, that affected the otherwise seemingly bizarre
status of the case which had had inconsistent appellate court resolutions on the same issue. 109
One of the plaintiff’s experts, an international law professor, had explained the civilian legal
systems in such detail and with such lucidity in his expert’s affidavit that the court was able to
reproduce many salient details in the court’s rendition of the relevant laws, both Russian and
French, in its opinion.110 The court also made a point of citing to a leading comparative law
textbook on the subject, which, again, the expert had used in his affidavit, in the court’s
depiction of how an otherwise bewildering (to common-law eyes) set of judicial circumstances
could have occurred.111
The plaintiff’s expert had been able to plow through the confusing nomenclature of a
Russian court (the High Arbitrazh Court) to indicate numerous reasons, including some stemming
from internal Russian judicial hierarchy, why the U.S. judge need not defer to its judgment.
Ultimately, the U.S. judge, after considering the interests of comity that led him initially to
presume deference to Russia’s High Arbitrasz Court, decided against deferring to its judgment,
despite the Russian court’s facial appearance of having supreme court status, as well as against
giving res judicata effect to a Paris Court of Appeals decision.112 The extensive legal analysis
based on comparative law sources, and, especially, on the adept comparative legal analysis of
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one of plaintiff’s foreign-law experts, is a rare occurrence in Rule 44.1 U.S. case law. It was not
clear from the opinion if the court had engaged in independent research concerning the foreign
law or if it had relied entirely on the authoritative comparative legal analysis of party experts.113
Because of the inherent difficulties associated with understanding and applying foreign
law, judges and scholars have counselled against U.S. courts’ engaging in an examination of
foreign law.114 This is not a realistic option today, however. U.S. courts increasingly must contend
with foreign law. The next sections deal with three principal areas in which U.S. courts contend
with foreign law today: forum non conveniens; discovery, and Section 1782 cases. In all of these
areas, U.S. courts are obliged to take foreign law into account and engage in comparative legal
analysis in some measure.
IV. Rule 44.1 and Forum Non Conveniens
The seminal case on forum non conveniens in transnational litigation is Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno,115 in which the United States Supreme Court set forth standards for a U.S. court’s
assessment of foreign law for purposes of determining the adequacy of the foreign forum the
defendant proposes in its motion to dismiss.116 U.S. courts will dismiss cases on forum non
conveniens even where, as in Piper, a plaintiff’s recovery will be lower in amount in the foreign
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Another exceptional expert who has been the subject of commentary is a Swiss law
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forum than in the U.S.,117 and even where some causes of action, such as strict liability, are not
available at all in the foreign forum,118 so long as the plaintiff would not be “deprived of any
remedy.”119 Forum non conveniens cases differ from Rule 44.1 cases in placing the burden
squarely on the parties to establish the adequacy of the foreign law (defendant’s burden),120 and
to refute the same (plaintiff’s burden).121 U.S. judges nevertheless are most frequently placed in
the same position in such cases as in Rule 44.1 cases inasmuch as they make these
determinations based on their assessments of party expert affidavits and reports, as in practice
do judges under Rule 44.1.122 On the other hand, courts have repeatedly held that the bar is very
low for a defendant to prevail on a forum non conveniens case, and in particular that ruling a
foreign nation’s law to be inadequate is so likely to be harmful to international comity that U.S.
judges generally do not explore foreign law once they have reached a determination that the
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foreign legal system would afford plaintiff some recovery, and that plaintiff would not be unfairly
treated.123 As one court stated, “this test is easy to pass.”124
According to Bookman, cases tend to be dismissed “because [they are] too foreign.”125
The importance of judicial understanding of the relevant foreign law is not diminished by the
current practice of not examining it before dismissing for forum non conveniens, however.
Understanding the foreign forum well enough to ascertain that it is adequate and preferable
requires an appreciation of the laws to which the case will be subject. An argument in Bookman’s
writing is that the alacrity with which U.S. courts dismiss cases in this area leads to deprivation
for the United States’ interest in adjudicating cases under its own laws.126 Born critiques the
heightened rate of dismissals where the plaintiff is foreign as “inconsistent with both principles
of customary international law and long-standing policies of the federal political branches, and
likely expos[ing] U.S. parties to comparable discrimination by foreign courts,”127 also noting that,
as a result of forum non conveniens dismissals, U.S. courts cannot make, inter alia, choice-of-law
decisions.128
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The inquiry into unfairness of treatment is severely constricted in practice by the courts’
reluctance to hold that a foreign state’s courts do not treat parties fairly because that is a
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As Symeonides has discussed, in the domestic context, conflicts law promotes and
recognizes state interests in their own laws.129 On the international level, Symeonides’ evocation
of a “revolution” is echoed by Muir-Watt, referring to transnational litigation, who speaks of a
crisis in conflict of laws due to globalization.130 According to Muir-Watt, conflict of laws
traditionally had been
understood both to provide an overall scheme of intelligibility through which to
understand other social spheres and to make available operational tools with which to
define authority, allocate responsibilities, and guide the conduct of of public and private
actors. However, the emergence of diffuse (post-Westphalian) forms of authority
challenges the law in these ordering functions.131
Seen through this lens,the evolution of forum non conveniens in the United States from a rare
outcome into a widely available one, goes hand in hand with transnationalization’s alteration of
conflicts of law. The Restatement (Third) of Conflicts, currently being drafted, has come under
criticism for insufficient attention to the international dimension.132
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See SYMEON SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 374375 (2006).
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131 Id. at 392.
132 See Ralf Michaels, The Conflicts Restatement and the World, 110 AJILUNB 115 (2016), Ralf
Michaels & Christopher Whytock, Internationalizing the New Conflict of Law Restatement, 27
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Generally thought to be a uniquely common-law doctrine,133 forum non conveniens has
come under considerable and varied criticism.134 It has been suggested that this doctrine,
rejected in civilian systems where a court’s jurisdiction over the parties obligates the court to
hear the case,135 should be abandoned altogether,136 and that its incoherent results “are at
odds with its stated objectives of promoting justice, fairness and and international comity.137
This section focuses on the doctrine as it affects federal judges and Rule 44.1. The least
controversial aspect of finding a foreign forum adequate is where U.S. courts do not hold
foreign courts to be inadequate merely because of attributes that are characteristic of non
common-law courts. Thus, U.S. courts generally hold that lack of jury trials in civil (non-criminal)
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This needs to be qualified by its availability in limited form in Panamanian maritime law, a
civil-law state. See Claudio Alberto Arrue Montenegro, Le forum non conveniens à l'assaut des
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cases;138 lack of punitive damages,139 lack of discovery,140 and other systemic attributes of the
civilian legal orders that dominate the world, are insufficient bases on which to deny dismissal
for forum non conveniens.141 Substantial criticism of the doctrine in transnational litigation
cases addresses the second prong of the foreign legal system inquiry, the more serious matter
of whether it will allow the plaintiff a fair hearing: “[B]y categorically rejecting generalized
accusations of corruption, delay, and other inadequacies in foreign judicial systems, or imposing
too high a level of proof on these points, federal courts ignore the realities of the nature of the
justice systems of many nations.”142 Bookman observes that forum non conveniens also has the
consequence of immunizing U.S. defendants at home and undermining the principle that U.S.
courts have general jurisdiction over a defendant where it is legally at home,143 a principle
strongly enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2014 in Daimler AG v. Bauman.144
As a general matter, U.S. courts eschew in-depth analyses of foreign legal systems in
forum non conveniens cases, rejecting plaintiff arguments that the U.S. forum is needed to

138Adamowicz

v. Barclays Private Equity France S.A.S., 2006 WL 728394 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Logan
Intern. Inc. v. 1556311 Alberta Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 2d 625, 633 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Adams v. Merck
& Co., Inc., 353 Fed. Appx. 960, 964 (5th Cir. 2009).
139 This was the case in Piper, supra note [76], where plaintiffs’ forum shopping was a concern
for the Court; accord, Exter Shipping Ltd., v. Kilakos, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1322 (N.D.Ga. 2004);
Warter V. Boston Securities, S.A., 380 F.Supp. 2d 1299, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
140 See, e.g., Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11 th Cir. 2001); Akerblom v.
Ezra Holdings, Ltd., 2012 WL 464917 *3 (S.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d, 509 Fed. Appx. 340 (5 th Cir.
2013); Logan Intern, Inc. v. 1556311 Alberta Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
141 See, e.g., Valenti ex rel v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 2011 WL 869189, *4 (D.N.J. 2011), explicitly
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warrant keeping the case in the U.S.
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143 Bookman, supra note [], at 1093.
144 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
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preserve their due process rights, with the courts stressing that to do so would be to condemn
an entire foreign nation’s judiciary, and that they will do this only under the most extreme
circumstances.145 In Shiley Inc. v. Superior Court,146 the court stated that such extreme
circumstances would be where “where the alternative forum is a foreign country whose courts
are ruled by a dictatorship, so that there is no independent judiciary or due process of law.”147
In practice, however, U.S. courts do not apply those criteria except in their most extreme
version of the above, and they tend to be particularly generous in granting forum non
conveniens dismissals if keeping the case would require application of foreign law.148
On the contrary, where plaintiffs argue that they will not be accorded due process, the
courts overwhelmingly reject plaintiffs’ position, on the ground of international comity, or by
analogizing to international comity, even in multiple cases where the U.S. Department of State
has made findings against the system in question,149 or where the European Union has
repeatedly done so and warned the Member State.150 The role of adjudicative international
comity in forum non conveniens has been critiqued in light of foreign countries’ evident
objections to U.S. courts dismissals of cases brought by their nationals against U.S. defendants,
as shown by their enacting laws to deny jurisdiction in their own courts to cases that have been
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dismissed in the U.S. for forum non conveniens.151 One judge has said that “[c]omity is not
achieved when the United States allows its multinational corporations to adhere to a double
standard when operating abroad and subsequently refuses to hold them accountable for those
actions.”152 Gardner notes that comity abstention, applied where a court seeks to avoid
conflicts with foreign law,153 contravenes “the Supreme Court’s renewed emphasis on the
‘virtually unflagging obligation’ of the federal courts ‘to exercise the jurisdiction given them’ by
Congress,”154 arguing also that international and national comity abstention issues are
similar.155
While numerous individual cases involve U.S. court dismissals to foreign countries
where evidence seemed fairly compelling of government corruption and lack of judicial
independence,156 Lii’s empirical study suggests a statistically meaningful correlation between
those attributes and U.S. court denial of forum non conveniens motions:
The worst bottom one-third of countries were found to be adequate only 67% of the
time. The medium countries were adequate 76% of the time. The best countries were
found to be adequate 86% of the time. The differences in adequacy rates between the
best countries and the other two tiers are statistically significant. Thus, even though the
definition of an adequate forum does not explicitly require it, there is evidence that
district courts are less likely to find foreign forums adequate in countries with
ineffective and corrupt governments and countries that lack the rule of law.157
151
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On the other hand, or put another way, however, this means that Lii’s figures indicate that U.S.
courts have a close to 70% finding of adequacy in the foreign forum among the countries
ranked most corrupt and most lacking in the rule of law. According to both Whytock and Lii in
their separate studies, about half of all forum non conveniens motions are granted,158 even
though, as Gardner has pointed out, the U.S. Supreme Court intended to have the doctrine of
forum non conveniens used only sparingly.159 Robertson concurs with the approximately 50
percent grant rate, further noting a 400 percentage increase in forum non conveniens cases
brought in transnational litigation in recent years.160 According to other commentators, “[w]hat
is clear is that virtually no case involving a transnational event is immune from a forum non
conveniens battle,”161 and that just about any reason a judge believes to mean that another
forum will be more satisfactory will suffice for a case to be dismissed.162
It has been argued that forum non conveniens requires a significant foray into foreign law
on the part of judges, who must “make a whole series of complex evaluations about the
availability of foreign evidence, the level of foreign interest in a case, and the content of foreign
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law.”163 In Piper, however, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s holding precisely
because it would require courts in forum non conveniens cases
frequently … to interpret the law of foreign jurisdictions. First, the trial court would have
to determine what law would apply if the case were tried in the chosen forum, and what
law would apply if the case were tried in the alternative forum. It would then have to
compare the rights, remedies, and procedures available under the law that would be
applied in each forum. Dismissal would be appropriate only if the court concluded that
the law applied by the alternative forum is as favorable to the plaintiff as that of the
chosen forum. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, is designed in part to
help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law.164
This United States Supreme Court directive to avoid U.S. judicial engagement with the
foreign law it confronts every day does not distinguish forum non conveniens from the other
frameworks in which the courts are faced with foreign cases in transnational litigation. Both
discovery law and Section 1782 cases have their own precedential equivalents.165 In practice,
however, among the various encounters U.S. judges have with foreign law, forum non conveniens
standards require the least assessment and understanding of foreign law, because (1) the courts
require the parties to bear all of the burdens of production and persuasion, as well as evidence
described as “not detailed”, with no or very little discovery; 166 and (2) the courts have set the bar
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for dismissal very low.167 Thus, their foreign-law inquiry tends to be more perfunctory under
current norms for granting dismissals under forum non conveniens than it legitimately can be in
discovery cases and Section 1782 cases, the two principal remaining areas in which U.S. courts
encounter foreign law in transnational litigation.
We have seen that Rule 44.1’s spirit is at loggerheads with the dominant trend in forum
non conveniens. As will be described in the next two sections, each of these two areas has a
precedential history of its own in discouraging courts from engaging in comparative legal analysis.
It is argued here that the necessity of encountering foreign law entails comparative law analysis
on the part of the courts. While Rule 44.1 accepts this necessity, and tries to facilitate it, and
while at the same time it is understandable that courts hesitate to engage in what the U.S.
Supreme Court has (quite accurately) termed a “slippery business,”168 the better procedure for
U.S. courts is to address the issue of foreign law wherever it appears by seeking to understand it,
and by learning how to do so.
V. Rule 44.1 and U.S. Discovery
A. Introduction

See FR 8 Singapore Pte. Ltd. v. Albacore Maritime, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 (S.D. N.Y.
2010).
167 On how low the bar is, see supra, note [102 – 103], and surrounding text. Significantly, it has
been argued that international comity, one rationale for dismissal in favor of a foreign country
with jurisdiction, should more properly be interpreted by the courts as giving plaintiffs access to
U.S. courts, and therefore militates against dismissals on forum non conveniens grounds. See
Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1491-92 (2011).
168 Intel, 542 U.S. at 243, n. 15.
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Discovery cases are unlike Rule 44.1 cases in that parties bear the burden of proof, but
to the extent that foreign law, such as a blocking statute, is an issue for the court to deal with in
discovery, the case becomes a hybrid that also encompasses Rule 44.1.169 One such case
involved the Eastern District of Michigan’s interpretation of a German data privacy blocking
statute.170 The court referred to Rule 44.1’s permitting it to consult any source it deemed
relevant to understanding the German law, including scholarly, legislative history, and case
law.171 The judge took his duty of independent assessment seriously in rejecting the German
expert’s interpretation of German law, stating that he could interpret the German statute
“informed by the ordinary principles of statutory construction and by reference to the plain
meaning of the statute itself.”172 He quoted language from the German statute to support his
conclusion that he should compel the discovery plaintiff had requested.173
The endeavor to understand and construe the German statute independently is what
Rule 44.1 drafters had in mind, and it has become a clear necessity in transnational discovery
cases today. Although Germany has what is probably the most highly developed system of
statutory construction in the world,174 and German legislators naturally are aware that
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statutory language will be subject to the German system of construction, the Michigan district
court judge in Knight Capital unfortunately proceeded to set forth U.S. principles of statutory
construction for understanding this German statute.175 U.S. principles are by comparison few in
number and so unsystematic that judges who are regularly tasked with interpreting statutes,
such as those on the D.C. Circuit court, have been known to state as a difficulty of their judicial
functions a dearth of sufficient legislative direction for statutory interpretation.176 The present
lack of comparative law education and training on the bench makes it a hit or miss event as to
how well U.S. judges are able to analyze when they do undertake a Rule 44.1 examination of
foreign law.
Court opinions show that U.S. judges generally undertake efforts to understand the
foreign law that parties argue in discovery cases because they must, sometimes while denying
that they are doing so, and sometimes seemingly in spite of themselves. In a telling statement
that reflects the unfulfilled hopes of Rule 44.1’s drafters concerning its ability to effect change
in judicial attitudes, as well as the relentlessness with which today’s modern judge confronts
the undeniable need to engage with foreign law, one court said: “Although the Court is
reluctant to interpret Swiss law, the Court finds the [Swiss] expert’s reading accurate.” 177
Judicial engagement with foreign law on discovery generally, although not always, is at a
deeper level than in forum non conveniens issues, despite the landmark U.S. Supreme Court
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discovery case where the concurring and dissenting justices expressed doubts about the U.S.
judge’s ability to do so.178

B. The European Union’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation179
Nothing epitomizes the deterritorialization of modern law as much as the movement of
data, as demonstrated by the cloud issues raised but ultimately not resolved by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Microsoft Corp.180 Kerr is among those who have questioned whether
there is territory at all in such cases,181 expressing the view that “the very idea of online data
being located in a physical ‘place’ is becoming rapidly outdated….,”182 an assertion Judge Lynch
quoted in his Second Circuit concurring opinion in Microsoft.183
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) concerns such issues since it
regulates modern data transmission. It took effect in 2018.184 Its subject overlaps with a
profound part of civilian legal orders’ general objection to the U.S. discovery system: a different
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philosophy of privacy that is deemed unacceptably intrusive to the civilian world.185 As a
regulation, it applies in each EU Member State.186 In terms of discovery and foreign law, U.S.
courts reason within the framework of traditional standards of U.S. discovery for transnational
cases, such as those surrounding a foreign defendant’s ability to assert with success a foreign
blocking statute’s penalties against its nationals as an argument to be relieved from a U.S.
judge’s Federal Civil Procedure Rule 26 discovery order.187 The GDPR has been described as
reversing the traditional issue that has occupied U.S. courts by posing the question of the
extraterritoriality of the European regulation, as opposed to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. discovery law to other countries.188 The GDPR does contain clear extraterritorial language
within it,189 but the U.S. judge considers the GDPR as similar to the standard blocking statute
inasmuch as both, from the judge’s perspective, represent a potential extraterritorial
infringement on the jurisdiction of the U.S. court, just as, in both cases, the European entity,
nation or EU, considers the U.S. discovery order to be an extraterritorial infringement on its
sovereignty.190
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See FABRE-MEYER, supra note [], at 200 (contrasting the U.S.’ approach to information
gathering with France’s protective stance as reflecting two diametrically opposed philosophies).
186 For a schematic overview of EU institutions, including the binding nature of regulations
within all member states, see Regulations, Directives and other acts, available at
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en (last visited July 27, 2020).
187 See infra Subsection B for a discussion of these issues.
188 Corby F. Burger, Note, Domesticating Comity: Territorial U.S. Discovery in Violation of
Foreign Privacy Laws, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2020).
189 See GDPR Art. 3; and European Data Protection Data Board Guidelines on the territorial
scope of the GDPR (Guidelines 3/2018) (available at edpb.europa.eu, [encrypted site] last
visited August 4, 2020).
190 See infra, note [149] [rapport Gauvain], and surrounding text.
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The GDPR does represent a notable difference from the traditional foreign blocking
statute, however, in that for the first time the party objecting to discovery may as likely be a
U.S. multinational entity as a foreign-based one, due to the law’s focus on the nationality of the
victim, not the defendant.191 It remains to be seen whether the prospect of U.S. companies
being subject to onerous penalties will affect the outcome of transnational discovery cases
applying the GDPR.192 In a case involving a foreign applicant in a Section 1782 case,193 the
subject of the next Section, which can, and in this case did, involve U.S. court discovery
assistance to a private party in foreign litigation, a U.S. court granted the foreign party all of
the discovery it requested, but only to the extent that this did not violate the GDPR, or,
alternatively, with that party’s obligation to remunerate its opponent for any fines that might
be imposed on it for violating the GDPR in order to comply with the U.S. court’s discovery
order.194 This case may illuminate the U.S. federal bench’s tendency to honor the GDPR more
completely where both litigants are foreign and the trial will occur abroad.195
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See infra, notes [156 – 160]. Corel Software, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 2018 WL 4855268 (D.
Utah 2018) was such a case, but the court opinion did not address the issue head on. See infra
notes – to --, and surrounding text. The GDPR is also seen as introducing a paradigmatic change
into French law. See Lucie Cluzel Métayer & Emilie Debaets, Le droit de la protection des
données personnelles: la loi du 20 juin 2018, 6 RFDA 1101,1103 (2018).
192 According to Art. 83(5), dealing with severer infringements, “Infringements … shall …be
subject to administrative fines up to 20 000 000 EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4 %
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher”.
193 As will be discussed in Section VII, infra, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 has separate standards from Rule
26 discovery cases.
194 In re Hansainvest Hanseatische Investment GmbH, 364 F. Supp.3d 243, 252 (S.D. N.Y. 2018).
195 In a similar vein, and referring to discovery, but at a stage in the litigation before discovery
requests had been made, see Morgan Art Foundation Ltd v. McKenzie, 2019 WL 2725625 (S.D.
N.Y. 2019) *4, discussed infra, note [182] (nationality of relevant parties not revealed in court
opinion). See also Pearlstine v. Blackberry Limited, 332 F.R.D. 117, 122 (S.D. N.Y. 2019). (Court
denied plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant to reveal a person’s private home address where
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The GDPR is a far strengthened version of a previous data privacy law that was deemed
insufficiently protective of its European citizens’ privacy.196 In keeping with other blocking
statutes across Continental Europe and with general European objections to U.S. discovery
laws, the GDPR makes clear how deep the European Union concern for privacy is, and also how
differently it is conceived in Europe and the United States. Civilian revulsion at U.S. discovery
has come from dual origins that are intermingled in the wish to rebel against submission to it:
U.S. discovery’s disregard for privacy rights as understood in Europe and its turning
unquestioned aspects of the civil-law legal order on its head. In France, for example, the legal
system forbids requiring a party to produce a document unfavorable to itself.197 It may be a
commonplace to say that a nation’s laws are tied to its society and history, but it is also a truth
that sheds light on why it is insufficient for a U.S. judge consider that a foreign law is
comprehensible once the judge has read an English translation of its text.198
The European Union was founded in the wake of the Second World War among
countries whose populations had been terrorized by the total invasiveness of private life by the
Nazis, whose massive gathering of information about individuals was used to enable

“Defendants have represented that, under the European Union's General
Data Protection Regulation, they are unable to disclose his address without his consent, which
they have not received.” The court did not analyze the issue in terms of explaining its weighing
of the Aérospatiale factors.)
196 See 1995 Data Protection Regulation, supra note [138].
197 Omar Attia, Secret des affaires et procédure de Discovery: quelle situation juridique pour les
entreprises françaises, Feb. 6, 2019, available at https://www.villagejustice.com/articles/directive-sur-secret-des-affaires-procedure-discovery-issue-des-etatsunis,30618.html (last visited August 4, 2020).
198 This would be an incomplete reading of the Seventh Circuit’s recommendation, but the
emphasis it has put on simply using translated foreign laws risks misleading the reader, as Judge
Woods argued in her concurring opinion in Bodum.
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deportations and annihilation throughout occupied Europe as well as Germany. Throughout
the Nazi years in Germany, citizens were spied on through trusted party members in every
apartment building and place of work.199 Not long after the end of the USSR, to this memory
was added that of the Stasi (East Germany’s secret police)200 and of the KGB within the newer
members of the EU. What may seem like an obsessive protection of privacy, including the “right
to be forgotten,” often the object of joking in the United States, is explained in terms of the
past in innumerable places on European business sites.201 In an era of ever-increasing data
collection in the United States, one might do well to consider as a cautionary tale the past state
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For an excellent source of information about daily life under the Nazis, see the slice of life
series spanning various social, ethnic and political strata, written by those who lived through
the period of 1933 through 1945 in Germany. GESCHICHTEN UND BERICHTE VON ZEITZEUGEN (JKL
Publikationen, Berlin).
200 Stasi is the German acronym for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State
Security) or Staatssicherheitsdienst (State Security Service). See Maryam Kamali, Accountability
for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of Transitional Justice in East Germany and South
Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANS’L L. 89,104 (2001).
201 See, e.g., Germany: Land of Data Protection and Security – But Why? Understanding the
German mentality to data protection and data privacy is fundamental to doing successful
business in the country, DOT MAGAZINE (Feb. 2017), available at
https://www.dotmagazine.online/issues/security/germany-land-of-data-protection-andsecurity-but-why (last visited July 27, 2020). On the right to be forgotten, see John W. Dowdell,
An American Right to Be Forgotten, 52 TULSA L. Rev. 311 (2017). In a beautiful article, James
Whitman goes much farther back than the twentieth century to find the roots of the respective
attitudes towards privacy in the prevailing concern for dignity and honor in Continental Europe
and for liberty in the United States. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151 (2004).
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abuses of collected data about European citizenry that inspired Europe’s GDPR.202 For the
GDPR, data protection is one of the EU citizen’s fundamental rights.203
Europe’s past also explains another aspect of the regulation that causes the wide
breadth of possibility for violating it: the GDPR’s focus is so overwhelmingly concentrated on
the rights of its citizenry to privacy that its reach is immeasurably vast. Thus, it encompasses
any company which does business with a citizen of any EU member state,204 and anyone who
either “processes”205 or “controls” data,206 and it insists on EU citizens’ need to consent to
having their data collected,207 and on their right to withdraw such consent at any time.208
Existing case law applying the GDPR has shown U.S. courts reasoning under the legal
standards set in place for determining whether to allow discovery under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which make it impossible for judges to do an effective job without understanding
relevant foreign laws and undertaking the comparative legal analysis needed to reach such an
understanding. The next section analyzes GDPR case law as of this writing, and hypothesizes

202

EU privacy law follows the civilian pattern of an overarching, codified set of rules. A critique
of U.S. privacy law focuses on its common-law aspects without analyzing them as such: that it
is driven by laws that respond to the situational needs or problems in society in a detailed
manner rather than through the formulation, as in Europe, of a general overview of principles,
even though this may preserve flexibility. See Braidyn Fairclough, Private Piracy: The
SHortcoings of the United States’ Data Privacy Regime and How to Fix It, 42 J. CORP. L. 461
(2016)
203 GDPR Art. 1 (2).
204 GDPR, Art. 3 (2).
205 Art. 4(8) defines a processor as any “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.”
206 Art. 4(7) defines a controller as any “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data ....”
207 GDPR, Art. 7.
208 Id.
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how the courts may develop their thinking in the future when GDPR enforcement action (or
inaction) against violations due to compliance with U.S. discovery orders can be profferred as
evidence.
C. The GDPR and Other U.S. Court Confrontations with Foreign Law in Discovery Cases
1. G.D.P.R. Transnational Discovery Cases
In keeping with U.S. courts’ principal way of dealing with foreign law, by avoiding it as
best they can, one such “foreign” law has been and continues to be the Hague Evidence
Convention,209 negotiated and ratified by the United States, which was intended to facilitate
the taking of evidence located abroad.210 Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Société
Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa211 that the treaty
was only a potential alternative means rather than the exclusive or even favored means for
obtaining evidence in transnational cases,212 discovery through the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has been the predominant method of getting discovery evidence in such cases.213 By
the time the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations of the United States was drafted, this
situation was so well established that the Restatement refers to the Hague Convention only as
an option available to a judge who rejects the federal rules:

209

Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Oct. 7, 1972,
23 U.S. T. 2555.
210 See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 534.
211 Supra note [].
212 Id. at 548.
213 This was predicted at the time of the decision by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and
O’Connor in their partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion to the case at id. (urging
that the Hague Convention be the first, preferred although not exclusive, method, and
suggesting that the Court’s decision would lead to “the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the
Convention [being] invoked [only]infrequently” in the future.)
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A court in the United States seeking the production of evidence located outside the
United States in a civil or commercial matter may use the mechanisms established by
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
… as an alternative to the authority to order the production of evidence under domestic
law.214
By applying the Federal Rules, U.S. judges have been able to prolong their unfamiliarity
with the workings of the treaty as they continue to apply the federal rules which they know
well and with which they are comfortable. Given that the Hague Convention does not provide
for the broad discovery considered fundamental to parties’ rights in the U.S. legal system, and
which many U.S. judges evoke, the Hague Convention seems the less preferable choice to U.S.
judges, but to European signatories, the Hague Convention is the exclusive means they
recognize as legitimate once a state has become a signatory; as such, they consider the United
States’ ratification of the treaty to signify its undertaking the obligation to use it as the exclusive
method of obtaining evidence in transnational cases.215
Failure to use the Hague Convention thus became another cause of indignation at U.S.
discovery after the treaty’s entry into force. This was foreseen by the four justices who partially
concurred and partially dissented in Aérospatiale: “Some might well regard the Court’s decision
in this case as an affront to the nations that have joined the United States in ratifying the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence …”.216 In France, Parliament passed a law in 1980 (its
amended blocking statute), specifically making the taking of depositions or other evidencegathering by foreign lawyers in France a criminal offence if conducted outside the scope of the

214

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §426, Reporters’ Notes 6.
See my discussion of this issue at Curran, 51 Akron L. Rev., at 860 – 861.
216 482 U.S. at 547 – 548 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J. and O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
215
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Hague Evidence Convention.217 When a German law expert expressed the German legal
position of the Hague Convention as having exclusive legitimacy in transnational discovery in his
brief on German law in Knight Capital, the U.S. judge responded that the German expert was
simply wrong: “[T]he expert's opinion that discovery is permissible only when conducted
according to the Hague Convention is flatly contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in
the Aerospatiale case …”,218 with no recognition that the German expert was asserting the
official legal position of Germany and of most civilian signatory nations.219
Ristau, a transnational litigation lawyer, recounts how, when he explained to a U.S.
district court judge that he needed to conduct depositions in France under the Hague
Convention rather than under U.S. federal rules lest he otherwise be put in jail in France, the
U.S. judge in the discovery dispute observed that it was silly for the French to have such a law
forbidding federal rules discovery in France, but that he would take the Hague Convention
request under advisement.220 At the time of the writing, Ristau, however, had not received the
court’s authorization to proceed with the Hague Convention rather than the Federal Rules of
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Loi no 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 (J.O. 17 juillet 1980), modifiant la Loi no 68-678 du 26 juillet
1968 relative à la communication de documents et renseignments d’ordre économique,
commercial, financier ou technique à des personnes physiques ou morales étrangères.
218 290 F. Supp. 3d at 689.
219

Harkness and his co-authors have put what is these states’ official positions as an
assumption: “[M]any contracting states operate on the assumption that the Hague Convention
is the only means for securing [extraterritorial] discovery.” TIMOTHY P. HAKNESS et al., DISCOVERY IN
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 16 – 17 (2015).
220 Bruno A. Ristau, Overview of International Judicial Assistance, 18 INT’L. LAWYER 521, 531 – 532
(1984).
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Civil Procedure.221 In a 2019 GDPR case,222 a California district court ruled against the defendant
which had argued that it would be violating the GDPR if it complied with federal rule
discovery.223 The court’s analysis started with the principles laid down by the Supreme court in
Aéropostale,224 and of the subsequent, nationally influential Ninth Circuit Richmark225 case. The
court did not find against the defendant by ruling that the plaintiff’s right to discovery prevailed
over the mandates of the GDPR; rather, it held that defendant had failed to prove that the
GDPR in fact prohibited it from producing the requested emails in unredacted form, a
conclusion that has been critiqued by scholarship;226 and that defendant had also failed to
prove that the GDPR’s penalties would be enforced even if defendant were found to have
violated its provisions.227 Since the GDPR is so new, there would have been no history available
to defendant of entities being subjected to the regulation’s penalties for complying with U.S.
discovery. It remains to be seen what U.S. courts will do if such penalties are imposed.
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Id.
Finjan, Inc. v. Zscaler, Inc., 2019 WL 618554 *1 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
223 Id. at *3.
224 Id. at *1. The criteria the Supreme Court set forth in Aérospatiale, widely applied since then,
are consistent with Restatement (Third) and (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations of the United
States standards, see Restatement (Third) and Fourth §442 (1) (c); and instruct courts to assess
the importance of the requested documents to the litigation; the specificity of the requests; the
location of the documents (in the United States or abroad, a factor of ever-less significance in
the era of e-discovery); if evidence located abroad originated in the United States; if deferring
to a blocking statute would harm U.S. interests or if the U.S. court’s requiring discovery would
contravene “important interests” of the foreign state. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544, n.28.
225 Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468 (9 th Cir. 1992).
226 More precisely, the court’s analysis of the GDPR as not prohibiting the unredacted emails is
criticized in David Zwier, Aérospatiale’s Comity Analysis Adapted for Discovery of GDPRProtected Materials, at 29 (manuscript on file with author).
227 Id. at *3.
222
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In a RICO case against a resident of Poland with U.S. citizenship, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that all of the Aérospatiale factors militated in favor of ordering the
defendant to produce the requested documents, including the United States’ interest. 228 As in
Finjan, the court found that defendant had not established that the discovery sought would
violate the GDPR.229 On the other hand, in another case, in response to defendant’s prediction
at the pleading stage that plaintiff would in the future try to evade discovery by invoking
blocking statutes, the Southern District of New York stated its intention with respect to
discovery as follows:
Plaintiff has merely indicated that it is subject to different privacy laws in different
jurisdictions… Plaintiff lodg[ed] general objection to discovery requests “to the extent
they request any documents that are protected by law, statute, or regulation, including
applicable privacy and data protection laws of Switzerland, England, and/or the
European Union, such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation, the Swiss Data
Protection Act, the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection, and the Swiss Criminal Code.
[Plaintiff] will produce any such responsive documents only in accordance with, and
upon and after complying with, all applicable laws, statutes, and regulations.” The Court
shall not penalize Plaintiff for complying with the laws of the jurisdictions in which it
operates.230
To date, GDPR cases do not yet have the often elaborate expert reports and even foreign
governmental explanations of foreign law that characterize many transnational discovery cases
concerning more established foreign blocking laws.231
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Giorgi Global Holdings, Inc. v. Smulski, 2020 WL 2571177 (E.D. Pa. 2020) *1-3.
Id. at 2.
230 Morgan Art Foundation Ltd v. McKenzie, 2019 WL 2725625 (S.D. N.Y. 2019) *4 (emphasis
added, parentheses omitted). One wonders if the court would have altered its pronouncement
had the plaintiff referred to the French blocking statute. The Swiss laws have a history of faring
better with U.S. courts for many years, starting with Société Internationale pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
231 Research for this article included every federal case mentioning the GDPR as of July 29,
2020.
229
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Where a U.S. court did engage on its own with the substance of the GDPR, in D’Amico
Dry D.A.C. v. Nikka Finance, Inc.,232 the court disagreed with defendant’s argument that
discovery by use of a videotaped deposition required his consent under the GDPR, which he
had withheld.233 The court quoted the relevant language of the GDPR to conclude that it only
required consent where the videotaped party was unaware of being taped, a somewhat
stretched if not mysterious interpretation of the language the court quoted.234 The issue of the
GDPR’s substantive content then became moot once the judge decided the regulation was
inapplicable. If in future cases parties objecting to discovery proffer EU interpretations of the
GDPR which contradict the D’Amico court’s understanding of this provision, especially if they
are in the context of GDPR enforcement actions, U.S courts will need to grapple again with the
issue of unconsented-to videotaped depositions of EU citizens.
Another case involved a Special Master’s findings, purportedly about the GDPR, but in
relating those findings, the District Court of New Jersey focused on the Restatement (or
Aéropostale) and Richmark factors.235 As in prior GDPR discovery cases, the court noted that
“[t]he Special Master also found, as an additional consideration to the fifth factor, that
Defendants failed to produce evidence that producing the information at issue here would lead
to an enforcement action against Daimler by an EU data protection supervisory authority for
breach of the GDPR. Indeed, whether an EU authority aggressively polices this type of data
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2018 WL 5116094 (S.D. Ala. 2018).
Id. at *4.
234 Id.
235 In re Mercedes Benz Emissions Litigation, 2020 WL 487288 (D. N.J. 2020) *5 – 7.
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production in the context of pre-trial discovery in U.S. litigation remains to be seen.”236 The
ubiquity of the GDPR’s reach combined with the severity of its penalties may cause U.S. courts
to proceed with more caution than they have been in the two years since the regulation was
adopted if the GDPR in fact enforces its provisions for violators which comply with U.S.
discovery orders, and if the importance of privacy in the EU can be successfully analogized to
that of privacy law in precedents interpreting Swiss bank privacy laws.237
2. Non-GDPR Transnational Discovery Cases
Foreign nations’ track record of enforcing their blocking statutes has been key to U. S
court interest-balancing analysis under Aérospatiale.238 This inquiry has been part of U.S.
courts’ foray into the law of other countries in transnational litigation. They have had to reach
conclusions based on party evidence, about the blocking laws and foreign legal measures to
enforce those statutes. Aérospatiale in its partial concurrence and partial dissent illustrates the
paradox of at least implicitly recommending the avoidance of foreign law analysis while itself
entering into a detailed (and admirable) discussion of it. The case involved the French blocking
statute.239 The Supreme Court majority relied on the lower court’s assessment in that case that
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Id. at *8, n. 5. (Emphasis added). U.S. courts in non-discovery cases may also be unwilling to
honor the GDPR where it would contravene the First Amendment. See In re DMCA Subpoena to
Reddit, Inc., 383 F. Supp.3d 900 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
237 See infra notes [222-223] and surrounding text.
238 See supra note [177] for the Aérospatiale factors.
239 Loi 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 relative à la communication de documents et renseignements
d'ordre économique, commercial ou technique à des personnes physiques ou morales
étrangères, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July 17, 1980, at 1700.
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France did not enforce its law against violators.240 Under Rule 44.1, technically, U.S. court
decisions about foreign law do not have stare decisis effect,241 but the U.S. judicial system is
inseparable from stare decisis. Consequently, after Aéropostale, courts have cited to the
Supreme Court and its progeny for the conclusion that France does not enforce its blocking
statute.242 This was in fact accurate for many years, but even after France had started to
enforce it, albeit not often or systematically,243 some courts refrained from going beyond
established U.S. precedent concerning the French law, citing to precedents predating French
application of its blocking statute to the effect that it was not enforced, and never had been
intended to be enforced.244
In 2016, an omnibus law was enacted in France, known as la loi Sapin II.245 It contains
provisions to strengthen France’s blocking statute, both in terms of penalties and enforcement
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Id. at 527, n. 9 (“[T]he legislative history [of the blocking law] shows only that the Law was
adopted to protect French interests from abusive foreign discovery procedures and excessive
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.”) (Internal quotation and citation omitted).
241 See Sparkling & Lanyi, supra note [3], at 63, critiquing this situation for the confusion it can
cause in terms of inconsistent findings and the need for repeated proof, without, however,
reference to the many cases in which courts do in fact rely on prior case law rulings despite the
bar on precedential effect.
242 E.g., Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 225 (E.D. N.Y. 2007).
243 See Curran, 51 Akron L. Rev., at 864, n. 48.
244 See Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP, 2017 WL 4287205 (N.D. Ill.
2017) at *4.
245 Art. 2, Loi n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la
corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique, JORF n°0287 du 10 décembre 2016,
available on Legifrance, French government site for legislation,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033558528&categorieLie
n=id [https://perma.cc/9XRX-B4JD].
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mechanism.246 In 2019, at the request of then Prime minister Philippe, Raphaël Gauvain, a
member of France’s Parliament, issued a report urging for stronger enforcement and penalties
under its blocking law.247 The report is unabashedly a statement of the need for France to fight
U.S. judicial extraterritorial economic harm done to France,248 titled Reestablishing France and
Europe’s Sovereignty and Protecting Our Businesses from Extraterritorial Laws and Acts.249
Ironically, the aim of protecting foreign national businesses from U.S. discovery is one of the
very aspects attributed to French blocking statutes by U.S. courts that has convinced them not
to allow French laws to stymie U.S. discovery under the Federal Rules.250 These new
developments in France seem poised to launch an era of enforcement of the French blocking
law against French companies which comply with U.S. discovery orders in violation of the
French statute. Since foreign enforcement is only one of the factors U.S. federal courts consider
in their analyses, however, it is far from clear if this will alter U.S. discovery decisions,
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See Décret n° 2016-66 du 29 janvier 2016 instituant un commissaire à l'information
stratégique et à la sécurité économiques et portant création d'un service à compétence
nationale dénommé ⪡ service de l'information stratégique et de la sécurité économiques ⪢,
ORF n°0025 du 30 janvier 2016, available on Legifrance, at
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000031940456&categorieLie
n=id [https://perma.cc/4C87-D9MY].
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See Raphaël Gauvain, Rétablir la souveraineté de la France et de l’Europe et protéger nos
entreprises des lois et mesures à portée extraterritoriale (June 26, 2019), available at
https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/194000532.pdf (last visited July 29,
2020).
248 See id., at 1.
249 Id.
250 See, e.g., Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“The blocking
statute obviously is a manifestation of French displeasure with American pretrial discovery
procedures…”); accord, Republic Technologies at *4.
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particularly in light of U.S. court reliance on precedential findings with respect to France’s
blocking statute,251 despite Rule 44.1’s theoretical rejection of stare decisis.252
Where established laws older than the GDPR have been raised and well briefed by
parties, U.S. court opinions occasionally analyze foreign law at some length. This was the case in
Graco, where the court went through several articles of the French blocking statute that it
deemed potentially applicable, discussing each.253 This did not lead it to apply the French
statute, however. The court stated its conclusion against application bluntly:
The Blocking Statute is not Graco's [the party requesting discovery] problem, and it is
not the court's problem; it is SKM's [the party invoking the French blocking statute]
problem. In enacting the Blocking Statute France imposed a serious disability on its
nationals. If SKM is unable to comply with the court's order, it runs a real risk of
suffering a default judgment or other severe sanctions.254

Just as U.S. courts have a tradition of not honoring France’s blocking statute, they have
a long one of respecting Switzerland’s, developed since the 1958 U.S. Supreme Court case in
Rogers analyzed and applied the Swiss bank privacy law, reasoning that it was enforceable
against defendant and a matter considered of great public interest to Switzerland.255 Given the
U.S. judge’s curtailment of discovery for some blocking states, such as Swiss banking privacy
law, strict enforcement of the GDPR may trigger a similar response, particularly in light of the
susceptibility of U.S. multinationals. It would seem but a small step for the post-Gauvain report,
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See e.g., Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375 (E.D. N.Y. 2000).
See supra note [214].
253 Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 508 – 511.
254 Id. at 527.
255 357 U.S. at ….
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post- loi Sapin II French blocking statute to become an analogous beneficiary of such
(speculated) new judicial analysis were it not for the Pavlovian sway of stare decisis.

VI. Rule 44.1 and Section 1782
Section 1782 is a subspecies of discovery in civil litigation. 256 It injects U.S. discovery
into the non common-law world, as it allows U.S. judicial assistance in aid of foreign litigation,
and applicants may be foreign, whether individuals, entities or courts.257 In this sense, it
reverses the infusion of the civilian into the American courtroom that is Rule 44.1’s hallmark as
is analyzed in earlier Sections of this article.258 Foreign litigants in transnational cases are taking
note of the signal advantages the U.S. discovery system can provide, with one study noting a
quadrupling of Section 1782 requests between 2005 and 2017.259 As the partial concurrence
and dissent pointed out in Aéropostale, the United States is unique in its vast discovery, with
civilian countries having an extremely limited ability of parties to obtain information from
adversaries, and even other common-law countries having nothing comparable to the U.S.
system.260
Although the idea behind Section 1782 was to provide U.S. judicial assistance abroad,
and it has been warmly welcomed by foreign litigants in private foreign lawsuits able to obtain
information from their opponents beyond anything comparable in the civilian systems which
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have no discovery,261 Section 1782 and U.S. discovery in general often are characterized by
serious commentators as part of a U.S. hegemonic drive to force its system on Europe to the
detriment of European economic interests.262 U.S. courts tend to see Section 1782 as a genuine
and generous offering of aid, with one court commenting that “Congress purposefully
engineered section 1782 as a one-way street [to] grant[] wide assistance to others, but demand
… nothing in return.”263 It is noteworthy that in 2005 the French Committee on Private
International Law began its report on obtaining evidence abroad by referring to 28 U.S.C. §1782
as raising a “jurisdictional conflict in the public international law sense.”264
Unlike Rule 44.1, Section 1782 both immerses U.S. courts in the totally foreign context
of usually dual foreign parties and always foreign tribunals and a foreign legal proceeding, while
simultaneously operating under the guidance of a U.S. Supreme Court that counsels avoidance
of engaging with foreign and comparative law in the sole Supreme Court precedent to have
decided a Section 1782 controversy, Intel. 265 The Court in Intel decided in the affirmative the
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issue of whether the European Commission (EC) had operated as a “tribunal” within the
meaning of Section 1782, despite its being the EU’s executive branch, and despite the EC’s
arguing that its function was not that of a tribunal.266 In reaching this decision, the Court
explored the structure of the EU legal system and how the EC should be perceived from a
comparative legal perspective.267 Yet the Court also stated that Section 1782 “does not direct
United States courts to engage in comparative analysis ….”268 The Court’s reasoning, echoing
that of Justice Ginsburg’s former colleague at Columbia Law School, Hans Smit,269 explaining
Section 1782 drafters’ idea, was that “[c]omparisons … can be fraught with danger.”270 In a
footnote, Justice Ginsburg further observed that “the comparison of systems is slippery
business.”271 The contrast between U.S. courts’ engaging in the comparative law analysis that
engaging with foreign law signifies, and that modern transnational litigation increasingly thrusts
upon them, and the reluctance to do so in light of its pitfalls and in light of precedential
direction to avoid it, typifies modern caselaw.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Intel partially stemmed from the majority’s denial of foreign
law’s significance, including the majority’s discounting the EC’s self-understanding of the nature
of its role within its own legal system.272 Justice Breyer’s interest in international comity has
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been a driving force throughout his jurisprudence and is also reflected in his book, The Court
and the World: The New Global Realities.273 Deference to Europe’s self-understanding is in
keeping with the global governance aspiration Wang has expressed as a Section 1789 reform
goal,274 and with the French International Private Law Committee’s criticism of both
Aérospatiale and Section 1782 as undermining the vital international legal cooperation the
Hague Evidence Convention embodies.275 Justice Ginsburg’s Intel approach is more protective
of the U.S. court’s prerogative to make its own assessment under Rule 44.1 of all foreign law, as
the Court reiterated in 2018 in Animal Science Products276 in another opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg, but this time a unanimous one which Justice Breyer joined, 277 limiting the U.S.
judge’s deference to a foreign government’s explanation of its domestic law, especially if there
might be “reason for caution” about that government’s partisanship.278
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The current tortured relation of U.S. courts in transnational litigation which analyze
foreign law where the procedural context renders this necessary, including forum non
conveniens, discovery and Section 1782 cases, while simultaneously saddled with precedential
instruction to avoid doing so, is a disincentive to judicial education, although many individual
judges have asked for assistance from practicing attorneys and others in becoming more adept
with foreign law,279 and although others have shown themselves able to analyze foreign law as
adeptly as any scholar or foreign-law expert.280 The paradox was reflected in Hans Smit’s own
argument about Section 1782, which I believe may have played a considerable influence on
Justice Ginsburg’s Intel view against U.S. Courts’ engaging in comparative law. Professor Smit,
originally from the Netherlands, and a long-time professor at Columbia Law School, a
comparatist who was involved in the 1964 amended version of the statute,281 explained that
Section 1782’s drafters
definitely did not want to have a request for cooperation [under Section 1782] turn into
an unduly expensive and time-consuming fight about foreign law. That would be quite
contrary to what was sought to be achieved. They also realized that, although civil law
countries do not have discovery rules similar to those of common law countries, they
often do have quite different procedures for discovering information that could not
properly be evaluated without rather broad understanding of the subtleties of the
applicable foreign system. It would, they judged, be wholly inappropriate, for an
American district judge to try to obtain this understanding for the purpose of honoring a
simple request for assistance.282
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Section 1782 is not a matter of “a simple request for assistance,” however, since it
involves complex decision-making by U.S. judges that requires them to analyze foreign law, just
as the majority in Intel engaged in even while cautioning against the practice. Similarly, Smit
himself was to explain the fallacy of a U.S. court opinion for failing to apply foreign legal
standards to a Section 1782 decision even as he maintained that U.S. district court judges
should not need to understand foreign law for such simple a matter as a Section 1782
request.283 Smit was explaining that the Second Circuit had not applied Section 1782 in
accordance with its drafters’ intent when it applied U.S. attorney-client standards to a case
involving a Spanish litigant in a Spanish court:
In the Sarrio284 case, [the Second Circuit] did not follow the analysis indicated by Section
1782. The evidence of which production was sought were documents under the control
of the bank in Spain and Great Britain. [The court’s] analysis focused on whether the
evidence was covered by the attorney-client privilege under American law. The
appropriate analysis would have focussed on whether the documents that were located
in Spain and Great Britain were covered by a privilege extended by Spanish or English
law….285

Section 1782 thus clearly is not a matter of a “simple request for assistance” that allows
the U.S. judge to remain impervious to foreign law. The next Section reviews and critiques the
recommendations that currently are being made to facilitate judicial access to foreign law, and
offers my own suggestions.
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VII. Overview of Potential Judicial Access to Foreign Law
It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that solutions are not independent of individual
human capacity and talent. No suggestion is likely to be universally applicable, and still less in a
mechanical way. Rule 44.1’s ideal of the judge who independently seeks and understands and
applies foreign law has not been fulfilled in general but it has in isolated cases. In a case that
was decided one year after Rule 44.1 was adopted, Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit in In re
Letters Rogatory286 offered an excellent exposition of French law after studying comparative
law scholarly articles. Further, his conclusions about French law took on the typical Pavlovian
precedential effect that Miller described,287 as later caselaw cited to it.288 Judge Friendly did not
shy away from embarking on the examination of a foreign legal system, and the comparative
analysis without which understanding a profoundly different systemic order cannot be
achieved, as Michaels and Whytock also have argued.289 Once he had reached a conclusion that
enabled him to decide his discovery issue, later judges could rely on his findings about French
law. Because of its rarity, it may be as vain to exalt this individual case as it is to reiterate the
intention of Rule 44.1’a drafters half a century later, since both have remained an ideal rather
than a common practice.
The human issue infuses the party expert issue with, as we have seen, the pitfalls of
foreign experts as well as American experts on foreign law being detailed in Section III. We also
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saw that some exceptional party experts who are adept, as was the case in Films by Jove,290
and the Swiss expert academic.291 effectively offer judges access to foreign law that is sufficient
to enable judicial decision-making. In recent years, several other suggestions have become
more common, such as court-appointed experts, analyzed earlier,292 court to court referrals
and requests to foreign governments for interpretations of foreign law.293 While such options
may work well in individual cases, caution is needed before implementing them, and these
suggestions should not be adopted as a panacea or as a replacement for U.S. judicial
examination of foreign law.
Court to court certification or direct contact with judges in another country concerning
foreign-law issues have been recommended as a way for U.S. judges to obtain information
without having to determine it themselves or to rely on party experts.294 Both Teitz and Hay
have pointed to the success of the Memorandum of Understanding between the highest courts
of New South Wales and New York, entered into by those courts’ chief judges.295 Where the
foreign court is in the civil-law world, however, the issues of communication examined earlier
with respect to foreign experts from the civilian world communicating with U.S. common-law
judges would be apposite. The judge on each side would understand the other through the
prism of each legal system’s institutions and vocabulary. In addition, where blocking statutes
and other issues touching on national sovereignty and deep-seated views of rights such as
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privacy are concerned, it cannot be discounted that judges will understand legal issues through
national legal concerns and goals. This need not mean that such contacts cannot be useful, but
rather that U.S. judges who delegate the foreign-law determinations that Rule 44.1 assigns to
them may run the risk of failing to understand all of the ramifications of the answers they
receive from abroad. In Animal Science, the Supreme Court referred approvingly to two
international treaties (to neither of which the United States belongs) which stipulate that where
a country obtains an official interpretation of another country’s law from the latter country, its
effect will not be binding.296
For the reasons mentioned above, international judicial dialogue outside the framework
of cases at bar is likely to be more productive as part of furthering mutual education and
understanding of each other’s legal systems, outlooks and concerns. The Hague Conference has
been tackling the issue of access to foreign law since 2006.297 The Conference has reached
conclusions and made recommendations, as well as developed Guiding Principles to be
Developed in Considering a Future Instrument,298 and instituted transnational judicial
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seminars299 and a judicial networks.300 While the United States has participated in the
Conference, it has not been among its most active participants.301
The liberality of Rule 44.1 opened the door for U.S. judges who welcomed foreign law
into their courtroom. Its drafters recognized that foreign law would become ever more of a
presence. As Judge Miner remarked, “These cases are beginning to form a significant part of the
business of the federal courts.”302 Unfortunately, as he observed, “foreign law has not been
welcomed.”303 There is no easy solution to this problem. For those on the bench with no
background in foreign languages and comparative law, an effort to read scholarly articles on the
subjects that arise in their courtrooms is called for. This article has emphasized the need for
judges to undertake to understand foreign law. It also has tried to demonstrate the importance
of their understanding the nature and difficulties of the undertaking.304 Good experts are
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needed to assist in this knowledge process. It would be most helpful if organizations such as the
American Law Institute, which has done a great deal to assist judges in adapting to the revised
rules aiming to limit the scope and extent of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, were also to spearhead an educational effort to educate the federal judiciary in
matters relating to Rule 44.1, along with the commendable training offered by the Federal
Judicial Center, many of whose publications deal with transnational legal issues and foreign
law.305 Similarly, the Bolch Judicial Institute of Duke University Law School offers training to
judges in dealing, among others, with the foreign law they encounter.306
New generations of U.S. lawyers are becoming more exposed to comparative law than
were their predecessors, and their memoranda and briefs to courts will become a vital part of
judicial education, as will the input judicial clerks. Efforts to teach law courses in foreign
languages which deal with foreign legal systems in U.S. law schools should be encouraged as
part of the undertaking to prepare the next generation of lawyers who will help to educate the
bench and who will practice law in a transnationalized legal world.
VIII. CONCLUSION
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An important, previously overlooked issue for the incorporation of foreign law in U.S.
federal courts is Rule 44.1’s inadvertent infusion of a civil-law method into common-law courts.
The struggle of U.S. courts to adjust to the mandates of the rule within the structures of their
courts has been a large part of the failure to accommodate to the goals of the rule, along with
more evident obstacles to ascertaining the nature of foreign law, such as locating foreign-law
materials and understanding the relevant foreign language. The common judicial reaction of
avoiding foreign law is neither feasible nor desirable today. While courts grant forum non
conveniens motions liberally without examining foreign law independently more than at a
superficial and cursory level, they do examine foreign law in transnational discovery issues,
including Section 1782 petitions, because their decisions are dependent on foreign-law analysis,
despite precedential warnings to avoid it. Those analyses are, however, hampered by a history
of judicial avoidance of foreign law as well as by Supreme Court adjudications which disfavor
comparative law.
Much has been said about the explosion of cases dealing with foreign parties and
circumstances in today’s courts due to globalization. Law’s transnationalization collides with
law as a national and territorial construct.307 While the post-pandemic era may see
reconfigurations in transnationalization’s patterns, territoriality’s increasing obsolescence
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derives from its source in the information-driven nature of the world.308 The fundamental
transition of society from a material- to a knowledge-based society309 suggests that, while the
means may change through which people connect, the connections across national borders will
remain robust. As long as virtual contacts continue to be conducted multinationally, with or
without physical presence involved, with likely increases in many transnational projects even as
the international aspects of crises impress themselves on the public consciousness, laws of
multiple nations will continue to need the attention of our courts and their presence in them
will continue to burgeon.
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